[author]CHEN Tianhao

[content]

How does active government embrace judicial oversight?Research Framework , Chinese Practice and Research Prospect

CHEN Tianhao   XU Wei   SHENG Yu

School of Public Policy & Management, Tsinghua University

Abstract: This study initially categorizes all 284 research papers on public administration's acceptance of judicial supervision from 1945 to 2022 in the field of public administration within the Web of Science database. It establishes a research framework“ driving factors-supervision modes-supervision effects” and illustrates the encompassing implementation of judicial supervision on public administration in China. Drawing upon this framework, the paper articulates three research propositions within the realm of concerning judicial oversight of public Western public administration scholarship concerning judicial oversight of public administration. Proposition l posits that the judicial supervision of public administration is propelled by diverse factors, encompassing shifts in the social milieu, individual perceptions, legislative endorsement for judicial oversight, inadequacies in administrative restraints, and the expansion, inertia, and internal imbalances of administrative power.Proposition 2 suggests that the judiciary employs four distinct modes to supervise public administration: case-by-case correction, litigation deterrence, systemic change, and normative guidance. Proposition 3 contends that judicial oversight of public administration has far-reaching effects on personnel, decision-making processes, and procedural norms thereby contributing to the normalization of the administrative system. Furthermore, it influences administrative performance, accountability structures, and rights protection ,ultimately augmenting comprehensive public governance. These effects are subject to modulation by multidimensional factors emanating from the spheres of the judiciary.administration , politics, and society. Expanding upon the established research framework this paper delves into practical instances of judicial oversight in the realm of public administration in China and puts forth two research prospects. Firstly, the research on judicial supervision of public administration encounters challenges in conceptual validity.These challenges arise from the absence of appropriate measures for key concepts.limitations in data sources hindering detailed empirical research, and methodological shortcomings affecting the validity of findings. To address these issues, this paper recommends the development of specialized indicators to measure key concepts , leveraging digital technology to broaden data sources, and adopting cutting-edge methods to enhance the causal discourse.Secondly,distinct disparities exist between China's reform experience and Western theoretical assumptions. In China, the social, legislative, and administrative elements shaping the external environment of judicial supervision exhibit a simultaneous and gradual relationship. Furthermore, the Chinese judiciary is intricately embedded within the party and government system. Consequently, this paper advocates fora comprehensive analysis of the factors propelling judicial oversight, an expanded exploration of the symbiotic relationship between the judiciary and administration, and a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of judicial supervision across three dimensions:political response , administrative performance , and rights protection.

Keywords:market economy;effective government;law-based government; judicial supervision

1. Introduction

In 1992, the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China established the goal of reforming the socialist market economy system. While promoting the construction of a capable government, China vigorously promoted the construction of a rule of law government. In 2023, the "Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Promoting the Development and Growth of the Private Economy" further emphasized the need to "improve the legal environment for equal protection of all types of ownership economies, and create a good and stable expectation for the development of the private economy. However, there is no natural fit between a proactive government and a rule of law government. In practice, judicial oversight of the government still shows strategic obedience (Yu Xiaohong, 2014), to the extent that "the use of public power to infringe upon private property rights, illegally seize and freeze private enterprise assets, and other phenomena occur from time to time".

Public administration research has long focused on how to coordinate legalism and managerialism. In the early days of the birth of public administration, legalism dominated, and Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900) both regarded public administration as the enforcement of public law. In the 20th century, with the rise of managerialism, how the government can efficiently respond to the needs of citizens and society became a focus of attention in the field of public management research. However, the rule of law's regulation of government power constrained the hands and feet of public administration, leading to a widespread "anti legal atmosphere" in public management (Waldo, 1984). Until Rosenbloom (1983) proposed to integrate public management through the three paths of "management, politics, and law," how to coordinate the three paths became a fundamental issue in public management (Waldo, 1984). Specifically, Rosenbloom (1983) believed that legalism includes three sources of knowledge, namely, legislators enacting administrative laws, judicial authorities promoting the judicialization of public administration, and constitutional provisions on citizens' rights, all of which have an impact on the supervision of public administration through the judiciary. Therefore, how to balance the government's compliance with the law and the government's initiative in judicial supervision of public administration has become a specific entry point for public management research on how to coordinate legalism and managerialism (Rosenbloom, 1987; Christensen et al. ,2011)。

In China, some scholars have reviewed the historical context of the separation and integration of law and public administration in Western public management (Yu Jianxing and Xiang Miao, 2016), and advocated that China's public management research should establish a new agenda of "rule of law administration" (Xiang Miao and Yu Jianxing, 2021). However, this study has not yet formed a unified framework and lacks a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese context. In view of this, this article summarizes the existing literature on public administration receiving judicial supervision in the field of public management, and extracts a research framework for public administration receiving judicial supervision; Subsequently, this research framework will be embedded into the Chinese context to present the practice of judicial supervision of public administration in China; Finally, based on this framework and combined with Chinese practice, this article proposes research prospects.

2.A research framework for the acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration

2.1 Literature review and research framework proposal

Sort out relevant papers in key foreign journals: ① Screen all 44 English journals in Public Administration (Category=Public Administration) based on the Web of Science database; ② Determine the time range for literature search as from the establishment of the journal to 2022; ③ Retrieve articles from the selected journals that contain keywords such as "judicial," "court," "judge," and "adjudication" in their titles or abstracts, eliminate conference papers and book reviews, and obtain 1411 articles Manually read 1411 literature and select 284 papers.

Preliminary analysis yielded the following observations. ① Post trend (see Figure 1). The overall number of articles in the field of public administration research on the acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration has been increasing year by year from 1945 to 2022, reaching its peak in the 1980s and entering a stable development stage after the 21st century Journal platform. The journal with the most published literature on the acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration is Public Administration Review (53 articles), followed by Journal of European Public Policy (25 articles) and Policy Studies Journal (25 articles) Research paradigm (Figure 2). There is more normative research and less empirical research, and qualitative research is more common in empirical research than quantitative research Research object. Most of the research focuses on the United States (164 articles, 57 75%), followed by the UK (38 articles, 13 38%), Canada (32 articles, 11 27%), Australia (14 articles, 4 93%). With the strengthening of the influence of the European Court of Justice on EU countries (48 articles, 16.) 9% of research has grown rapidly, but there has been relatively little attention paid to developing countries (11 articles, 3 87%).

After carefully reading the 284 selected papers, this article extracts a research framework for judicial supervision of public administration consisting of three aspects: driving factors, supervision modes, and supervision effects (see Figure 3).

2.2 Driving factors for judicial supervision of public administration

2.2.1 The Evolution of Social Organisms

Firstly, there have been changes in the social environment. Since the 20th century, economic development and technological progress have brought many new social problems, which have provided an opportunity for judicial supervision of public administration. The development of emerging technologies such as nuclear energy (Vig and Bruer, 1982) and DNA recombination (Pletenik and Cooper, 1992) requires courts to provide specialized legal guidance for administrative agencies to regulate new technologies. The new social pattern will also deepen the degree of judicial supervision over public administration, for example, economic liberalization has increased the need to reduce transaction costs, leading to informal negotiations between businesses and governments gradually being replaced by formal court rulings (Van Waarden and Hildebrand, 2009). Secondly, personal cognition is also undergoing changes. Firstly, there is the awakening of rights awareness. Since the 1960s, the rise of the equal rights movement has not only encouraged ordinary citizens to actively sue to prevent administrative agencies from infringing on their individual constitutional rights (Rosenbloom, 1987), but also led public employees to use litigation to fight for rights such as freedom of speech (Martin, 1973). In addition, the popularization of constitutional education has strengthened citizens' awareness and ability to use the law (Kagan, 1991), and recognized that judicial review can counteract illegal administrative decisions (Lee, 1986).

2.2.2 Legislative response

On the one hand, the legislative body is increasingly lacking in administrative constraints. In response to environmental changes and political differences, laws often use vague language (Jackson, 1990; Kagan, 1991), which requires judicial authorities to clarify normative content. When the legislative body avoids thorny issues in order to avoid political conflicts, interest groups will turn to the judiciary to solve problems (Cramton, 1976), and even promote systemic reforms through the judiciary (Gallas, 1971). On the other hand, legislation is increasingly supporting judicial supervision. At the constitutional level, when a country's constitution establishes that the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court has the power to review the constitutionality of administrative actions, the judiciary can decide the future direction of public policy through its rulings on key issues (Jackson, 1990; Sheldrick, 2003). At the legal level, the 1946 Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that courts have the power to overturn unreasonable administrative decisions made by administrative agencies (Carroll et al., 1983), and various laws represented by the Clean Air Act also require the decision-making process of administrative agencies to be open to the public, which broadens the channels for citizens to challenge administrative decisions through judicial agencies (Kochtcheva, 2009). Legal tradition can also have an impact. In countries that place greater emphasis on legal stability, high legislative costs lead to judicial activism, such as in the United States and Canada (Allison and L'Esp é rance, 2017); In countries that tend to resolve disputes through political negotiations and informal consultations, the degree of judicial supervision of public administration is usually lower, such as in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Drewry, 1990; Van Waarden and Hildebrand. Misconduct in Public Administration, 2009).

2.2.3 Misconduct in public administration

The specific manifestations of misconduct in public administration are as follows:. Firstly, the expansion of administrative power. In the 20th century, administrative states emerged, and non elected administrative personnel began to wield more power. Citizens gradually lost their influence over the government (Rosenbloom, 1980), which drove them to seek government responses through judicial channels (Rosenbloom et al., 2018; Roberts, 2019). Secondly, administrative power was lax. When the performance of administrative agencies fails to meet social expectations, the affected parties will seek help from the courts to resolve the crisis (Cramton, 1976). This is manifested not only in the resistance of administrative inaction to reform, such as the resistance of government transparency laws in Eastern European countries by administrative agencies, which were ultimately pushed forward by judicial intervention (Cob â rzan et al., 2008), but also in the ineffective implementation of public governance by administration, such as Argentina's long-term poor governance in areas such as environment and healthcare, which led the public to seek judicial supervision of public administration to improve governance performance (Kramarz et al., 2017). Thirdly, there is an imbalance within the administrative system. In terms of vertical relationships, jurisdictional disputes between central and local governments often require courts to make rulings, with one party seeking judicial rulings to prove the constitutionality of their claims (Russell, 1977); In terms of horizontal relationships, different political actors may also have power disputes in order to advance their respective policy agendas. The weaker party will seek judicial means to break the deadlock and promote their own agenda to gain support. At this point, the decision-making field of power shifts from administration to judiciary (Russell, 1985; Kramarz et al. ,2017)。

Proposition 1: Changes in social environment and personal cognition, insufficient legislative support for judicial supervision and administrative constraints, expansion, laziness, and internal imbalance of administrative power drive judicial supervision of public administration.

2.3 The supervision mode of judicial supervision of public administration

The intermediaries through which judicial authorities exert influence on administrative authorities can be divided into two types: judicial rulings and judicial information (Galanter, 1983); Administrative agencies also have two identities when facing judicial supervision, namely parties to specific disputes and non parties. Based on the above two dimensions, the modes of judicial supervision of public administration can be classified into four types, namely case correction type (judgment x party), litigation deterrence type (information x party), system transformation type (judgment x non party), and normative guidance type (information x non party).

2.3.1 Correction of individual cases

Case correction judicial supervision refers to the influence exerted by judicial authorities on administrative agencies as parties to disputes through judicial rulings. Firstly, the legality of judicial judgments on administrative actions. Administrative decisions have an impact on individual rights, leading to a large number of lawsuits against administrative agencies. In this case, the court can correct illegal administrative actions based on individual judgments. For example, in the Rutan (1990) case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the government cannot promote, transfer, hire, or dismiss employees based on their political affiliation. The sued state of Illinois immediately issued an order to adjust the original policy (Hamilton, 1993). At this time, judicial oversight only denied the legality of the original policy and reserved the discretion of how the new policy was formulated to the executive branch. Secondly, judicial rulings promote structural reform. When the court considers that the infringement of the legitimate rights of the counterpart by the administrative agency is rooted in structural obstacles of the organization, the court will promote structural reforms in public administration (Bertelli, 2004) until the plaintiff's substantive demands are met. If the plaintiff and defendant can reach a consent decree on the reform measures, the court can urge the administrative agency to promote relevant reforms based on the decree; If both parties cannot reach an agreement on the law, the court will directly stipulate the reform measures that the administrative agency should follow, and establish a special supervisory agency to supervise its completion of the reform, or even directly take over the operation of the administrative agency. This type of structural reform is widely present in public sectors such as prisons (Duncombe and Strauss, 1993), psychiatric hospitals (Yarbrough, 1982), and schools (O'Leary and Wise, 1991).

2.3.2 Litigation deterrence

Litigation deterrence judicial supervision refers to the influence exerted by judicial organs on administrative organs as parties to disputes through the dissemination of judicial information. In practice, the vast majority of disputes between parties are resolved through negotiation outside of the courtroom (Galanter, 1983), which is known as "bargaining in the shadow of law", where the court conveys judicial information about litigation costs, remedies, and judgment preferences to potential parties, providing bargaining chips for the parties to negotiate (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979), and the parties then engage in a game based on their own chips to reach consensus (Intoccia, 2002). When administrative agencies act as parties to disputes, this dispute resolution mechanism manifests as a litigation deterrent judicial supervision, which can be specifically distinguished into two situations. Firstly, in cases where all parties involved are administrative agencies. Disputes may arise between the central and local governments, and as credible adjudicators, courts can increase the likelihood of feasible solutions being reached between different levels of government (Russell, 1985). Disputes may also arise between supranational institutions and governments of various countries, for example, the European Commission may use the precedent of the European Court of Justice to threaten lawsuits against member state governments that do not cooperate with EU policies (Wasserfallen, 2010). When governments perceive the threat of litigation, they may choose to appease the European Commission with minimal policy reforms in order to avoid possible judgments (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013). Secondly, only one party among the parties involved is an administrative agency. At this point, the other party is often individuals and interest groups who will use litigation to pressure administrative agencies. Administrative agencies will choose to resolve disputes through negotiation in order to avoid the cost of litigation (Sheldrick, 2003). In 2008, the Danish immigration authorities imposed strict restrictions on the residency rights of non EU spouses of EU citizens. The Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende questioned this practice based on the latest case law of the European Court of Justice and threatened to sue, ultimately forcing the Danish immigration authorities to relax the restrictions on the residency rights of non EU spouses (Blauberger, 2012).

2.3.3 System transformation

System transformative judicial supervision refers to the influence exerted by judicial organs on administrative organs that are not parties to disputes through judgments. In general, the influence of court rulings is limited to the parties involved in the case, but when the Supreme Court's rulings have universal binding force, they can promote systematic changes in the administrative system. This type of judicial supervision usually interprets controversial legal norms, and administrative actions that contradict this interpretation are subject to judicial constraints. Taking public personnel management in the United States as an example, on the one hand, the Supreme Court has clarified the protection of the constitutional rights of public officials through a series of case judgments. All government agencies other than the parties involved in the case are required to make corresponding reforms in areas such as minimum wage for public officials (Howard, 1985), employment discrimination (Wilkins, 2006), and political dismissal (Daniel, 1992). On the other hand, the US Supreme Court has also strengthened the legal responsibility of public officials, allowing citizens to claim compensation from officials who make malicious or unreasonable administrative decisions, greatly weakening the immunity of public officials (Rosenbloom, 1980; Cooper, 1985). In addition, the interpretation of the constitutional equal protection clause by the US Supreme Court has also triggered systematic changes in public schools' enrollment policies, financial subsidies, and other aspects (Evans et al., 1997; Hicklin, 2007).

2.3.4 Standardized guidelines

Normative guidance based judicial supervision refers to the influence exerted by judicial organs on administrative organs that are not parties to disputes through the transmission of judicial information. After receiving information from the court, administrative agencies will proactively adapt to regulatory requirements and carry out their own reforms. This impact is mainly manifested as perceived constraints, where the normative pressure formed by court precedents guides public managers to make policy choices (Koenig and Kise, 1996). Firstly, when the local situation is similar to the situation in the place where the court case occurred, considering that similar judicial supervision may also occur locally, the local administrative authorities will actively follow the guidance of foreign judicial norms. A local official in Illinois took the initiative to adjust policies due to concerns about similar lawsuits in other areas happening locally (Koenig and Kise, 1996). Secondly, in the process of promoting public policies, administrative agencies will proactively adjust their policy choices based on past precedents (Langer and Brace, 2005). When dealing with the poll tax crisis in the early 1990s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, considering that her initial policy plan conflicted with the historical precedents of the courts, ultimately abandoned the plan (James, 1996).

Proposition 2: The judiciary supervises public administration through four methods: case correction, litigation deterrence, system reform, and normative guidance.

2.4 The supervisory effect of judicial supervision on public administration

2.4.1 Promote the standardization of the administrative system

Firstly, enhance the professional standards of administrative personnel. Firstly, the US Supreme Court has elevated the constitutional rights of public officials in areas such as employment discrimination (Mitchell, 2009) and freedom of speech (Vinzant and Roback, 1994). Secondly, court precedents have led to public officials bearing greater legal responsibility for their administrative decisions (Rosenbloom, 1980) and being required to accept stricter constraints from higher-level authorities (Roberts, 2015). Again, judicial decisions can alter the agenda setting of administrative agencies, requiring them to adjust the professional direction of public officials to meet their needs. For example, when courts require environmental assessments, the expertise of personnel within the United States Bureau of Land Management shifts towards the field of environmental science (Nelson, 1985); Faced with increasingly frequent lawsuits, administrative agencies will also strengthen the legal knowledge training of public officials to improve their ability to respond to lawsuits (James, 1996). Finally, the judiciary clarifies specific legal issues to ensure that public officials have clear task standards, boosts their spirit of public service (Platt et al., 2010), and permeates legal values into the culture of public administration (Rosenbloom, 1987). However, excessive judicial intervention can also damage the public responsibility of public officials (Cramton, 1976), and the time and energy consumed in responding to lawsuits can undermine their confidence and morale (Koenig and Kise, 1996).

Secondly, reshape the agenda orientation of administrative decision-making. Firstly, adjust financial resources. On the one hand, judicial intervention can alter the internal budget allocation of administrative agencies, directing funds towards projects of concern to the courts (Blankenau and Skidmore, 2004); On the other hand, judicial supervision can also change the budget allocation between administrative agencies, bringing budget increments to peripheral administrative agencies (Hale, 1979; O'Leary and Wise,1991)。 Secondly, establish a policy agenda. With the deepening of judicial supervision of public administration, courts have gradually gained the power to shape policy agendas (procedural agenda setting power), giving higher priority to the implementation of projects they value within administrative agencies (Deters and Falkner, 2021). In addition, the court also has the gatekeeping power to restrict the policy choices of administrative agencies through precedents, that is, judicial supervision creates a chilling effect on administrative agencies. When they are not confident in obtaining judicial support, they tend to refuse to make decisions or make decisions within the scope allowed by judicial precedents (Lubow and Schmidt, 2021). Once again, revise the administrative decision. The court will request the administrative agency to rectify the illegal behavior and take remedial measures in specific cases (Jones and Taylor, 1995), and the administrative agency will also make advance revisions to administrative decisions by predicting the court's response, such as strengthening information disclosure (Gailmard and Patty, 2017), reducing the detention of immigrants, etc. (Miaz and Achermann, 2022). Finally, allocate decision-making power. Judicial supervision can affect the distribution of decision-making power among different entities, including central and local governments (Weiland and O'Leary, 1997), same level administrative agencies (Thiruvengadam and Joshi, 2012), and different public officials within administrative agencies (Bertelli, 2004). As interest groups can participate in the formulation of public policies through litigation, decision-making power is also shifting from administrative agencies to the market and society (Moffet, 1994).

Thirdly, promote fairness and compliance in administrative procedures. Firstly, proactively reform the procedures. Administrative agencies will follow more rules established by the court in administrative procedures to meet compliance requirements (Hamilton, 1993), as well as enhance their ability to respond to judicial supervision, including setting up a legal dispute resolution department (Shaffer, 2006), increasing funding for legal offices (Waltenburg and Swinford, 1999), and hiring more legal professionals (Limbocker et al., 2022). Secondly, the passive reform process. Administrative agencies lose specific cases and have to comply with court orders to reform administrative procedures, such as the establishment of new functions in personnel management systems (Gantz and Plant, 1988), procedural requirements for police evidence collection (Baum, 1978), and environmental assessment standards in administrative approvals (Nelson, 1985).

2.4.2 Enhance the comprehensiveness of public governance

Firstly, triggering complex performance indicators. Some literature has focused on the positive effects of judicial supervision on administrative performance, pointing out that it has opened a window of opportunity for actors opposing the regulatory status quo (Blauberger, 2012), forced administrative agencies to include controversial issues in policy agendas (Wasserfallen, 2010), and ultimately alleviated racial discrimination in public education (Reardon et al., 2012), increased education subsidies for impoverished school districts (Evans et al., 1997), reduced campaign corruption in presidential elections (Kim, 2007), and improved environmental governance in urban construction (Zeemering, 2010). However, some literature also points out that judicial supervision has a negative impact on administrative performance. Judicial supervision of public administration disrupts administrative processes, leading to more juvenile delinquency (Buttrick, 1995), poorer public education (Wise and O'Leary, 2003), and lower enrollment rates for minority groups in popular universities (Hicklin, 2007), which in turn triggers more severe social divisions (Nelson, 1985).

Secondly, promote a multidimensional accountability structure. Some scholars believe that judicial supervision of public administration itself is an important component of political democracy (Koenig and Kise, 1996). Political actors using litigation to intervene in policies or conducting negotiations under judicial supervision can help ease political conflicts and strengthen political accountability (Russell, 1985). However, some scholars believe that judicial supervision can undermine democratic accountability (Amado, 2001; Selle and Ø sterud, 2006), especially when judicial supervision lacks external checks and balances. If judges replace the management role of administrative agencies and cause governance chaos, there is no appropriate accountability mechanism (Kramarz et al., 2017).

Thirdly, promote strict protection of rights. The judicial authorities have increased the legal means available to citizens when facing administrative infringement, including allowing individuals to sue public officials (Rosenbloom, 1981) and providing channels for individuals to participate in the formulation of administrative rules (Kagan, 1991). Due to the enormous social influence of the court, the protection of individual rights of public officials may also spill over to the private sector, strengthening its protection of equal rights for employees (Richman, 1994). However, it cannot be ignored that the emphasis on individual rights by judicial authorities can also trigger a litigation tendency in the whole society, and more social actors expect to resolve disputes with administrative authorities through judicial rather than legislative means (Hale, 1979).

2.4.3 Multidimensional factors play a regulatory role

Firstly, the judicial dimension. Firstly, the capacity of judicial organs affects the effectiveness of judicial supervision. Previous studies have criticized judges for lacking professional knowledge in public administration and being unable to substantially address public issues (Carroll et al., 1983); Kramarz et al. ,2017), But some scholars have also pointed out that when the court needs professional knowledge, external experts can be sought (Vig and Bruer, 1982). Secondly, the willingness of judicial supervision of public administration will affect the effectiveness of supervision. Judicial authorities may exhibit different attitudes of self-restraint and proactivity in supervision, which determines whether administrative authorities can maintain broad discretion in internal organizational management and external policy implementation (Sheldrick, 2003; Wise and O'Leary,2003)。 Finally, the characteristics of judicial decisions affect the way administrative agencies respond. When the reform implemented by the court faces opposition from public opinion, the higher the clarity of the judgment, the higher the possibility of the administrative agency executing the court order. Conversely, if the judicial judgment is vague, the administrative agency will not fully execute the court order under public opinion pressure (Bullock and Regens, 1982).

Secondly, the administrative dimension. Firstly, the insufficient enforcement capacity of administrative agencies can lead to distorted court decisions (Yarbrough, 1982; Wise and O'Leary,2003), For example, in situations where government finances are tight, court orders can disrupt the government's budget balance and result in outcomes that are contrary to the court's intentions (Duncombe and Strauss, 1993; Blankenau and Skidmore,2004)。 Secondly, the attitude of administrative agencies affects the effectiveness of judicial decisions. When administrative agencies wish to use judicial supervision to obtain additional budget (Straussman, 1986) or to enhance the legitimacy of administrative actions (Feldman, 1988), they will actively cooperate with judicial agencies. On the contrary, when administrative agencies hold a negative attitude towards judicial supervision, they will adopt strategic measures to resist judicial supervision (Johnson, 1979). Finally, the characteristics of administrative decisions can also affect the effectiveness of judicial supervision. For example, when the professionalism and technicality of administrative decisions are high, courts tend to respect the discretion of administrative agencies (James, 1996).

Thirdly, the political dimension. Firstly, the attitude of political actors towards judicial decisions may enhance the effectiveness of judicial supervision. For example, legislators with the same intention as the court can use judicial supervision to promote the implementation of their policy agenda and the formation of new legislation (Allred, 2002), which will consolidate the effectiveness of judicial supervision. On the contrary, political signals opposing court decisions are also received and amplified by administrative agencies, which strategically enforce court orders (Martinsen et al., 2019), thereby limiting the effectiveness of judicial supervision. In some cases, political opposition can even lead to legislation overturning judicial decisions (Rawlings, 1986).

Fourth, the social dimension. The legal mobilization of citizens and social consensus on the protection of rights can enhance the effectiveness of judicial supervision (Sheldrick, 2003), while court rulings provide an opportunity window for citizens to take bottom-up action strategies, both of which together constitute the driving force for promoting government reform (Lewis, 1997; Panke, 2007). Conversely, when citizens generally oppose the court's position, the motivation of administrative agencies to resist court orders and weaken the influence of the court will also significantly increase (Seikel, 2015). In addition, compared to citizens, interest groups have clear visions, rigorous structures, and abundant resources, which can carry out more legal mobilization, promote the formation of social consensus, and ultimately achieve greater policy changes (Slepcevic, 2009; Conant et al. ,2018)。

Proposition 3: The acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration will affect administrative personnel, decision-making, and procedures, promote the standardization of the administrative system, and affect administrative performance, accountability structure, and rights protection, enhancing the comprehensiveness of public governance. The multidimensional factors of judiciary, administration, politics, and society have a moderating effect on the above effects.

2.5 Research Review

There are some shortcomings in the research on the acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration outside the region. Firstly, empirical research is not systematic enough. O'Leary and Strauss (1993) reviewed the literature on the influence of American courts on public management, pointing out that most studies only rely on court precedents and logical thinking to derive viewpoints, and generally lack empirical evidence to support them (Osorio and O'Leary, 2017). This study also found that existing Western research mainly relies on normative analysis in terms of paradigm (64 44%), and qualitative methods are mainly used in empirical research (23 94%), with a few studies using quantitative research methods (11 62%). The long-term lack of systematic empirical research has made it difficult for scholars to accumulate consensus on issues of common concern, and a general explanatory model has not yet been formed. Secondly, the constructive relationship between the judiciary and administration has been overlooked. Researchers generally assume an adversarial legal relationship between the judiciary and administration, but the judiciary and administration also cooperate to a certain extent driven by common goals, thus forming a constructive relationship (Cooper, 1985; Fisher et al. ,2014)。 The lack of attention to the latter has led to insufficient explanatory power of existing research on practice. Thirdly, the experiential materials are mainly based on the practices of Western countries. The attention of the foreign public management academic community to judicial supervision of public administration is mainly focused on Western countries such as the United States. Whether the practice of accepting judicial supervision of public administration in non Western countries also has explanatory power remains to be further tested.

3. The Practice of Public Administration Accepting Judicial Supervision in China

Improving China's socialist market economy system requires the government to be both law-abiding and proactive. How to reconcile the tension between the two requires a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the specific practice of China's public administration accepting judicial supervision. Therefore, the aforementioned research framework should be combined with the process of China's rule of law construction to systematically present the practical changes of China's public administration accepting judicial supervision.

3.1 The driving factors of judicial supervision of public administration in China

3.1.1 The Evolution of Social Organisms

The reform and opening up have activated the market economy. With the development of society, individuals are increasingly solidifying their own boundaries with legal rights and defending their rights through litigation (Shi Yunqing, 2013). In the early days of the establishment of the administrative litigation system, the public generally believed that "citizens suing officials" was like "eggs hitting stones" and held a negative attitude towards judicial supervision of administration (Finder, 1989). Since the mid to late 1990s, using legal knowledge and legal channels to confront administrative agencies has become a common practice from rural to urban areas (Pei, 1997); O'Brien and Li,2004) 。 Of course, this still has heterogeneity: in regions with higher levels of economic development and urbanization (Li, 2013), as well as for populations with higher levels of education (Cheng Jinhua, 2009; Gallagher and Yang,2017) , The situation of supervising administrative agencies through administrative litigation is more frequent.

3.1.2 Legislative response

In order to meet the needs of reform and opening up, the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress passed the Civil Procedure Law (for trial implementation) in 1982, which for the first time stipulated that citizens could exercise judicial supervision over administration. Later, the Administrative Procedure Law, promulgated in 1989, formally established the judicial review system. Starting from this, China has embarked on a reform path of building a rule of law government led by legislation (Ying Songnian, 2017), and has successively promulgated a series of laws such as the National Compensation Law (1994) and the Administrative Penalty Law (1996). In 2015, 2022, and 2023, the Administrative Litigation Law, Administrative Penalty Law, and Administrative Reconsideration Law were revised respectively. Previous studies have found that after the revision of the Administrative Litigation Law in 2015, there has been a significant increase in the number of administrative litigation cases accepted in the first instance (He Haibo, 2018).

3.1.3 Misconduct in public administration

In the 1990s, administrative system reform mainly focused on relaxing government intervention in the market In the 21st century, the central government proposed to build a service-oriented government and strengthen public service functions Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the goal of administrative system reform has been further enriched to "improve the functions of government economic regulation, market supervision, social management, public services, ecological environment protection, etc. Previous studies have found that areas where public administration frequently intervenes often result in more administrative litigation. In the 1990s, administrative agencies in the fields of public security, land management, and business administration constituted the main objects of judicial intervention and supervision (Pei, 1997); In the 21st century, the proportion of public security organs involved in litigation has decreased from 45% to 7%, while the proportion of urban construction and labor departments has significantly increased (He Haibo, 2018).

3.2 The supervision mode of judicial supervision of public administration in China

3.2.1 Correction of individual cases

According to the Administrative Litigation Law, administrative counterparties have the right to request the court to review the legality of administrative actions. On the one hand, courts are increasingly equipped with means to determine the illegality of administrative actions at the individual case level. The Administrative Litigation Law promulgated in 1989 only stipulates four types of judgments: maintenance, revocation, modification, and performance. In 2000, judicial interpretations added judgments for rejecting litigation requests and confirming judgments. In 2015, the Administrative Litigation Law was revised to remove the maintenance judgment, add the payment judgment, continue to perform the agreement judgment, and improve the revocation judgment, modification judgment, and confirmation of invalid judgment (Yang Weidong, 2015). The rich judgment methods enable the court to more comprehensively supervise administrative violations (Jiang Bixin, 2001). On the other hand, there is still a lack of institutional arrangements for courts to promote structural reform through individual legality reviews. Since the establishment of the administrative litigation system in 1989, the object of legality review in administrative litigation has always been limited to specific administrative actions (Finder, 1989), and more comprehensive abstract administrative actions have been excluded from the scope of cases to this day. The 2015 amendment to the law only made limited breakthroughs, and the court still cannot change their effectiveness through judgment (Jiang Ming'an, 2015).

3.2.2 Litigation deterrence

Administrative litigation can also be used as a deterrent to supervise public administration. Firstly, administrative counterparties use litigation as a deterrent. In practice, the counterparty may threaten the administrative agency to reach an out of court settlement by filing a lawsuit, and withdraw the lawsuit after the settlement is reached. The practice of mediation under the pretext of withdrawal of the lawsuit not only avoids the administrative agency losing the case, but also seeks more benefits for the counterparty, and the court avoids conflicts with the administrative agency (Pei, 1997). In 2015, the Administrative Litigation Law was revised to include provisions allowing for mediation in cases where administrative agencies exercise their discretionary power as stipulated by laws and regulations. Secondly, other government agencies use litigation as a deterrent. In 2015, the trial of public interest litigation by procuratorates began. Procuratorates mainly used pre litigation procedures to supervise administrative agencies to perform their duties in accordance with the law. If they failed to rectify according to prosecutorial suggestions as scheduled, procuratorates had the right to file administrative lawsuits with the court, which constituted the "Damocles sword" hanging over administrative agencies (Wang and Xia, 2023). In practice, the vast majority of administrative public interest cases are resolved through pre litigation procedures, with less than 2% of cases being sued during the pilot period (Hu Weilie and Tian Kai, 2017). This proportion further decreased to 0% after the reform of prosecutorial public interest litigation shifted from pilot to nationwide implementation 5% (Liu Yi, 2020).

3.2.3 System transformation

In addition to litigation, judicial authorities also supervise administrative agencies through binding public policies. Firstly, judicial interpretation. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "two highs") have the power to issue judicial interpretations to handle legal application issues in trial and prosecution work. Judicial interpretations have legal effect and universal binding force. If scholars analyze the relevant judicial interpretations of the Administrative Litigation Law, they believe that the Supreme Court has promoted the expansion of the scope of public administration review through judicial interpretations, granted the judiciary the power of fact review of local regulations, and extended the legality review of internal administrative actions (Yu Lingyun, 2008). Secondly, guiding cases. Both the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Court have the right to issue guiding cases to summarize trial experience and unify legal application. Taking the court as an example, people's courts at all levels should refer to guiding cases when adjudicating similar cases. If they do not refer to them, they will face the risk of changing or revoking the judgment. Since the establishment of this system in 2010, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have issued a total of 49 guiding cases related to public administration, developing rules for calculating the deadline for government information disclosure, and promoting systematic changes (Wang Tianhua, 2016).

3.2.4 Standardized guidelines

Judicial authorities can also exert influence on public administration by issuing recommendations, cases, etc. with normative legitimacy. Firstly, typical cases. Typical cases are released to the public, and all levels of law enforcement agencies can summarize their own trial experience and release typical cases, but they only express the judicial authorities' understanding of legal norms and do not have binding force. Since 1985, the Supreme People's Court has been issuing "Bulletin Cases", and the various judicial divisions and local courts of the Supreme People's Court will also issue typified typical cases. Secondly, judicial advice. Judicial recommendations are issued to specific targets. Since 2007, the Supreme People's Court has required courts at all levels to proactively raise issues discovered during trial work to the responsible authorities through judicial recommendations, in order to resolve individual disputes, supervise policy adjustments, improve administrative procedures, etc. (Lu Chao, 2015). In practice, judicial advice is also widely applied, for example, from 2008 to 2011, Jiangsu Provincial Court sent a total of 1227 judicial advice (Huang Xuexian and Ding Yu, 2011). Thirdly, the linkage between the government and the hospital. The linkage between the government and the court provides a platform for the exchange of normative information between the judiciary and administration, promoting the construction of the rule of law in administrative organs (Zhang Zhiyuan, 2020). In 2020, the procuratorial organs in Jilin Province resolved 298 administrative disputes in the procuratorial process, 13 administrative disputes in the reconsideration process, and 12 administrative disputes in the pre litigation and litigation process with the cooperation of administrative organs and courts.

3.3 The Supervision Effect of Judicial Supervision on Public Administration in China

3.3.1 Promote the standardization of the administrative system

Firstly, for public officials, existing research mainly focuses on their acceptance of judicial supervision. On the one hand, challenging administrative authority through the judiciary can trigger public officials' aversion and strategic behavior towards judicial supervision. Public officials may refuse to appear in court, answer questions from judges, or pay litigation fees after being sued (O'Brien and Li, 2004). After losing the lawsuit, public officials will be more cautious in law enforcement and avoid taking measures that are prone to litigation (Zhang and Ortolano, 2010). On the other hand, studies have also shown that the participation of public officials in litigation trials increases their respect for the rule of law and the judiciary. If a county magistrate appears in court and expresses that, through the judge's explanation and communication with the plaintiff, they can recognize their own shortcomings in work (He, 2013).

Secondly, for administrative decision-making, research not only focuses on whether the judiciary can correct illegal decisions, but also on the impact of judicial supervision on the agenda setting of administrative agencies. On the one hand, administrative litigation constitutes an external driving force for the government to promote rule of law administration (Yao Ruimin, 2014). For example, local environmental protection departments levy fees on unreported noise source facilities, which are deemed illegal by the court after being sued. Environmental protection departments realize that they lack legal authority and no longer levy fees (Zhang and Ortolano, 2010). On the other hand, judicial supervision can also change the policy agenda of administrative agencies. For example, administrative litigation, judicial advice, etc. can attract local governments to pay more attention to environmental issues (Zhang and Ortolano, 2010; Chen Tianhao et al., 2020), land acquisition and demolition issues (He, 2013), etc. Through judicial supervision, local law enforcement agencies, vulnerable groups, local residents, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and others have to some extent shared the power to set policy agendas.

Finally, for administrative procedures, existing research has distinguished between the active and passive paths of judicial supervision in changing administrative procedures. On the one hand, judicial supervision guides the reform process of administrative organs. If the court points out through judicial advice that there are flaws in the hearing and evaluation procedures of administrative agencies in handling housing demolition, although it does not affect the substantive results, it is recommended that they improve the relevant procedures (Lu Chao, 2015). On the other hand, judicial supervision forces administrative agencies to reform their procedures. If the Haidian District Court of Beijing ruled against Peking University for violating the principle of due process in the Liu Yanwen case, the Ministry of Education will subsequently initiate amendments to the Degree Law, incorporating both the hearing of arguments and the service of process procedures (He Haibo, 2009).

3.3.2 Enhance the comprehensiveness of public governance

Firstly, regarding administrative performance. On the one hand, judicial supervision will affect the arrangement of administrative agencies in promoting core work. For example, if local governments implement illegal administrative measures to complete their central tasks, strong supervision by judicial authorities can reduce the efficiency of the administrative center's tasks (Xiang Miao and Yu Jianxing, 2022), resulting in judicial authorities often showing respect for the core policies of local governments (Yu Xiaohong, 2014). On the other hand, judicial supervision will also gather administrative resources in peripheral policy areas to improve their administrative performance. For example, some scholars have found that information disclosure litigation can significantly improve the information disclosure performance of local governments (Han Wanqu, 2020), while prosecutorial administrative public interest litigation can significantly reduce urban wastewater discharge (Chen Tianhao et al., 2020).

Secondly, regarding political accountability. On the one hand, administrative litigation allows citizens to exert legal pressure on administrative agencies from the bottom up. If a survey shows that 92 2% of respondents believe that administrative litigation initiated by administrative counterparties has a promoting effect on county-level governments' lawful administration (Yao Ruimin, 2014). On the other hand, the implementation of political accountability through judicial supervision still faces multiple obstacles and has limited effectiveness. In the first case of government procurement, although market entities exerted pressure through administrative litigation to coordinate internal responsibilities between the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission, the flaws in legislation and the division of labor within the administration could not be directly adjusted through judicial supervision. The court spent 10 years making final judgments at the individual case level, but the issue of allocation of responsibilities between departments has not been resolved (Pei Junwei and Chen Huirong, 2018).

Finally, regarding the protection of rights. On the one hand, under the background of comprehensive rule of law, many judicial system reforms implemented in China have effectively enhanced judicial autonomy and played a role in constraining public power. For example, the provincial unified management of people, property, and finances by local courts has significantly improved the success rate of enterprises in administrative litigation (Zhao Renjie and Zhang Jiakai, 2022). On the other hand, some studies have pointed out that judicial supervision of public administration exhibits "conditional justice", for example, for every level increase in the position of the defendant's administrative agency relative to the court, the probability of the plaintiff winning the lawsuit decreases by 42 99% (Zhou et al., 2021).

3.3.3 Multidimensional factors play a regulatory role

Firstly, in terms of the judicial dimension. On the one hand, the professional competence of judicial organs is closely related to the effectiveness of judicial supervision. For example, research has found that the specialized reform of environmental courts has significantly increased and improved the number and efficiency of environmental pollution cases, significantly reducing pollutant emissions (Fan Ziying and Zhao Renjie, 2019). On the other hand, the negative attitude of judicial authorities towards implementing supervision will hinder the effectiveness of implementation. If the enforcement judges show a fear of difficulties when facing administrative agencies in a dominant position (Wang Xuehui and Cheng Yi, 2020), this negative supervisory attitude will also manifest as vague performance standards and deadlines in judgments (Ma Huaide, 2019).

Secondly, in terms of administrative dimensions. On the one hand, the insufficient capacity of administrative agencies makes it difficult for judicial supervision to be effective. As Ma Huaide and Jie Zhiyong (1999) found, in "old, young, border poor" areas, financial constraints often prevent administrative agencies from fulfilling judgments. On the other hand, the attitude of administrative agencies towards judicial supervision determines the effectiveness of supervision. For example, Zhang and Ortolano (2010) found that judicial supervision can effectively change administrative activities when government officials have legal knowledge and agree with court rulings. On the contrary, when local governments are hostile to judicial supervision, they will resort to measures such as obstructing evidence collection, refusing to appear in court, and forcing courts to dismiss cases (O'Brien and Li, 2004).

Again, in terms of political dimension. The support of the Party Central Committee for the rule of law work is an important political foundation for the effectiveness of judicial supervision of public administration in China. This political support enhances the capacity of judicial organs and changes the attitude of administrative organs through legislation and institutional reforms. For example, the positive political signal of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee on ensuring fair justice and improving judicial credibility has promoted judicial and administrative reforms. Among them, judicial reforms such as provincial unified management of personnel, property, and assets in local courts and circuit courts have enhanced the protection of the rights of market entities when facing administrative agencies (Huang Jun et al., 2021; Zhao Renjie and Zhang Jiakai, 2022). Strong political signals have also strengthened the willingness of administrative agencies to comply with judicial supervision, and the rate of administrative officials appearing in court to respond has significantly increased (Qin Hui and Chen Junting, 2023).

Finally, in terms of the social dimension. On the one hand, citizens' stronger awareness of safeguarding their rights provides an opportunity for judicial supervision. For example, scholars have found that the emission reduction effect of environmental courts is more significant in areas where residents have a higher degree of rights protection (Fan Ziying and Zhao Renjie, 2019). The more familiar citizens are with legal provisions, the more effective administrative litigation can play a positive role in supervising street bureaucrats' law enforcement (Pan Xinmei and He Bin, 2017). On the other hand, as the main medium for disseminating public opinion, the media is an important source of social pressure to urge administrative agencies to govern in accordance with the law. Surveys have shown that 97 7% of people believe that being exposed by the media is an important driving force for county governments to administer according to law (Yao Ruimin, 2014).

4.Research prospects

Based on the review of existing research on judicial supervision of public administration in both foreign and domestic contexts, this article proposes the following two research prospects.

4.1 Promote theoretical construction through systematic empirical research

Existing studies generally have deficiencies in empirical methods and data, which limits the validity of research findings. Firstly, the lack of appropriate measurement for key concepts leads to insufficient construct validity. Scholars have proposed concepts such as "adversarial legalism" (Kagan, 1991), "new partnerships" (Rosenbloom, 1987), and "new tripartite relationships" (O'Leary and Wise, 1991) to describe the acceptance of judicial supervision in public administration, but there has always been a lack of appropriate measurement for these concepts. Secondly, the limitations of data sources make it difficult to conduct detailed and in-depth empirical research. The causal mechanism between information disclosure litigation and local government information disclosure performance is difficult to carry out due to the lack of effective data (Han Wanqu, 2020). Although scholars enhance their detailed understanding of causal mechanisms through case studies (He, 2013), this also limits the extrapolation of research conclusions. Finally, the limitations of the research methodology limit the validity of the research conclusions. The endogeneity issue between the provincial administrative litigation rate and its influencing factors has not been resolved (Li, 2013), and the causal relationship between judicial supervision and government lawful administration has not been tested (Yao Ruimin, 2014).

Given the above shortcomings, future research can be improved in the following areas. Firstly, establish specialized indicators to measure key concepts. Starting from the judicial end, relevant frequency setting indicators are extracted through the proportion of administrative losses, financial expenditures of judicial organs, educational background and experience of administrative judges, and work reports of judicial organs to measure the degree, ability, and willingness of judicial supervision of public administration; Starting from the administrative end, measure the effectiveness of judicial supervision of public administration based on indicators such as the number of governance institutions within administrative agencies, the proportion of personnel with legal backgrounds, and the weight of rule of law related content in government work reports. Secondly, utilizing digital technology to expand data sources. Using text analysis techniques to extract, clean, and calibrate public texts such as judicial judgments, government work reports, normative documents, and relevant content on online political platforms (Xin and Cai, 2020). Using audio and video processing technology to analyze video materials such as live court hearings, and conducting emotional analysis on the speech rate and fundamental frequency of judges and defendants in administrative agencies (Tang Yingmao and Liu Zhuang, 2021; Lv Xiaoli et al., 2022). Thirdly, introduce cutting-edge methods to improve causal discourse. In terms of causal inference, cutting-edge causal inference methods can be used to evaluate the impact of judicial reform on judicial supervision of public administration (Li Wenzhao and Xu Wen, 2022), and social network analysis can be used to describe the cooperation network of different actors in judicial supervision (Kang et al., 2014); In terms of causal mechanisms, qualitative research methods such as causal process tracing can also be introduced to analyze the governance logic and internal mechanisms of public administration accepting judicial supervision (Yang Lihua and He Yuanzeng, 2013).

4.2 Developing theoretical framework based on China's reform experience

China's reform experience differs from existing Western theoretical assumptions in the following two aspects. Firstly, the social, legislative, and administrative elements that serve as the external environment for judicial supervision exhibit a synchronous and gradual relationship. Since the French Revolution, Western civil society has gradually formed. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the legalization of public administration in major Western countries was successively completed. By the end of the 19th century, the rise of administrative states triggered the practice of active judicial supervision of public administration (Rosenbloom, 1981). It can be seen that various external factors driving judicial supervision in Western countries have a diachronic characteristic. In China, since the late 1970s of reform and opening up, the state has shifted from overall control to granting certain autonomy to various fields of society and economy. In this transformation process, civil society has gradually formed and the rule of law system has been synchronously constructed. While weakening overall control, the administrative system has gradually shifted to strengthening its own hierarchy and service through technological governance (Qu Jingdong et al., 2009). It can be seen that the social, legislative, and administrative elements driving judicial supervision of public administration in our country exhibit a synchronous and progressive characteristic of mutual conditions and support. Secondly, as the main body of judicial supervision, the judicial organs are embedded within the party and government system. Following Montesquieu's separation of powers, the West generally emphasizes that the judiciary should be independent of the legislative, executive, and political forces. In China, the party's governance of politics and law is one of the main governance experiences of the CPC's successful leadership of the revolution, and is supported by our Constitution. This is reflected not only in the political support of the Party for the independent exercise of power by the judicial organs, but also in the political requirements of the Party for the judicial organs to safeguard the Party's central work (Zhou Shangjun, 2017), such as providing legal protection for achieving political goals such as high-quality economic and social development. At the same time, democratic centralism constitutes the basic organizational principle of our country. One government, one committee and two houses are jointly responsible to the National People's Congress. National institutions should play their functional advantages to jointly promote national modernization (Zhang Xiang, 2018). Therefore, the relationship between the judiciary and administration in China is based on the functional requirements of national governance.

Based on the above characteristics, the following research can be promoted in the future. Firstly, analyze the various influencing factors that drive judicial supervision from a holistic perspective. Existing research on the situation in China mostly focuses on some driving factors: for example, Cheng Jinhua (2009) focuses on social change, He Haibo (2018) focuses on legislative improvement and administrative reform, and Finder (1989) also discusses the improvement of China's legal system and the transformation of its socio-economic structure after the reform and opening up. Considering the synchronous and gradual development of social, legislative, and administrative factors in our country, in the future, more consideration should be given to these three factors as interrelated entities for research. Special attention should be paid to the interaction mechanism between different driving factors and the driving effect of the three factors as a whole on judicial supervision of public administration. Secondly, beyond the confrontational perspective, expand research on the constructive relationship between judiciary and administration. Although there is tension between administration and justice in terms of organizational goals, mutual cooperation can be beneficial in achieving their respective goals, and therefore can shift from confrontation to cooperation, which is the constructive relationship between judiciary and administration (Cooper, 1985). Unlike the theoretical framework based on legal adversarial theory in the West, China's judicial supervision of public administration has shown a large number of reform practices of positive interaction between judiciary and administration, such as the pre consultation mechanism in public interest litigation (Chen Tianhao et al., 2020) and the promotion of the government court linkage mechanism to promote substantive resolution of disputes (Zhang Zhiyuan, 2020). This is rooted in the institutional positioning of China's judicial organs embedded in the party and government system. In the future, more research should be conducted on the constructive relationship between judicial supervision and public administration through Chinese cases, such as analyzing the specific factors and mechanisms that promote constructive relationships, analyzing the effectiveness of judicial supervision under constructive relationships, and exploring the factors and mechanisms that affect the effectiveness of supervision under constructive relationships. Thirdly, comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of judicial supervision from three dimensions: political response, administrative performance, and rights protection. Rosenbloom (1980) pointed out that public administration needs to achieve a balance in three dimensions: political response, management efficiency, and rights protection. The rise of administrative states in the early 20th century in the West challenged existing political structures and rights frameworks, triggering active judicial supervision. Against this backdrop, Western public management research focuses more on the impact of judicial supervision on administrative performance, and takes it for granted to enhance response to vulnerable groups and strengthen the protection of individual rights (Osorio and O'Leary, 2017). In China, the long chain of delegation and agency between the central and local governments has led to alignment issues in political responses (Zhou Xueguang, 2011). Due to the ongoing improvement of civil society and the rule of law, there are still violations of citizens' rights by administrative agencies (Cheng Jinhua, 2009). The embedded nature of the judiciary also makes it difficult for it to effectively supervise the same level of government (Yu Jianxing and Gao Xiang, 2012). Therefore, the public management academic community in China should conduct research on the effectiveness of judicial supervision of public administration. In the future, the role of judicial supervision in administrative performance, political response, and rights protection should be considered together. This includes analyzing the coordination mechanism between various goals of judicial supervision of public administration, as well as its impact on each goal and the overall effect it presents.