[author]Wang Qiliang

[content]

Author Wang Qiliang

Vice President of Kunming University of Science and Technology and Professor of the Law School

Planning Committee Member, China Institute for Socio-Legal Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Abstract: The "fields" of legal studies refer to where laws exist, function or play a role. Access to the "fields" is vital to develop valid and practical theories of law. A valid legal theory directs to legal practice rather than an operational scheme of legal issues. Legal theory bases its validity on thorough examination of legal phenomenon, practice, condition of action, institutional logic, as well as interrelation between law and the society. In the meantime，practicality means that legal theory is able to explain real problems, bring forward theoretical or policy-oriented implications, and evaluate the functioning of law. The "fields" are of plurality, allowing for the application of plural research approaches, theories and perspectives, and for the development of general theories from comparative case studies. Moreover, "field" studies enable researchers to share the facts and ideas, which contribute to produce effective debates, integrate and develop new theories. In this sense, the field-based approach of legal studies, rather than simple emotional experience or factual data collection, also serves to develop legal theories.

Key Words: Fields; Valid Theory; Practicality; Holism; Social Science

1. Introduction: Validity and Practicability of legal theory

What kind of legal theory we need depends on what the purpose is. As some scholars have pointed out, "jurisprudential knowledge has a dimension oriented towards the practice of the rule of law" and "the knowledge needed for the practice of the rule of law is the integration of many different kinds of knowledge, and the prerequisite for integration is to make clear the cognitive perspectives and different functions of different kinds of knowledge". The normative approach to the study of law, such as legal doctrine or what has been called legal hermeneutics or legal interpretation, provides an operational programme of how to apply the law from within the law. It provides the theories, methods and training that ensure the general functioning of the legal system and provide the basic skills for the day-to-day practice of judicial practitioners. The core function of such a progression is to maximize the resolution of cases or problems within the legal system, which is a reflection of its effectiveness and practicality. However, it is important to note that "knowledge of techniques and knowledge of phenomena are not to be confused", and that the normative approach and the social science approach have different areas and limits of utility. From the perspective of social sciences, understanding practice and contributing to the improvement of the legal system require jurisprudential interpretation based on "factual" explanations. Jurisprudence is not only about norms or justice, but its pluralistic approach and problematic awareness also point to broader issues of legal practice and governance than norms and justice.

Effective legal theory in the social science sense is not an operational programme for the practice of law, much less a theory-to-theory cycle. The most central feature of an effective legal theory is that it addresses the intellectual isolation or the gap between law and society that an "insider's perspective" of law can bring about. Legal theory in this context does not assume that the practice of law can be reduced to the interpretation or application of legal texts or legal reasoning, nor does it assume that the law is necessarily correct or that there is a single correct answer. There are many possible solutions to problems, the law can therefore be improved, and the law has an instrumental character. Such a theory of law initially noted the problems of "law in action" versus "law in books", and the gap between legal concepts and the real world. Under the label of "legal-social studies", a number of theoretical schools and research approaches were formed. Briefly, the validity of legal theory is precisely due to its external perspective and its acceptance of other social and humanistic disciplines, which provide multiple intellectual sources for understanding and improving the legal system. This intellectual access comes from legal theory's awareness and grasp of the workings of law, its social consequences, its effectiveness, and the context in which it is embedded, and includes at least some of the dimensions of describing and understanding, criticising and reflecting on, and subverting and constructing legal phenomena and institutions.

Effective legal theory points to the practice of law. The practicality of legal theory points to at least two orientations: First, it is based on theoretical explanations that provide policy recommendations for the improvement of the legal system; Second, it is able to provide an assessment of legal norms, and at this level, "practice is a matter of 'what is to be' taken as such rather than 'what is' perceived". There is a certain amount of controversy about these two orientations, underlying which are different perceptions of what constitutes the practicality of theory. Both orientations have significance for legal theory, and in many cases they are not even contradictory. If we want to obtain a consideration and assessment of legal norms, we first need to have a grasp of the operation of legal norms. As the saying goes, "If you want to explain the world with theory, you first need to know how the world is". For this reason, legal theories aiming at validity and practicability often point to experience and have a pragmatic orientation. In academia and in the field of legal education, the production and teaching of theory has been subject to many expectations or self-expectations, but has been unsatisfactory, and has always faced two problems: Firstly, some flashy theories have caused learners to fall into a fog and lose their confidence in theories; Secondly, it has failed to provide intellectually useful help in understanding the difficult problems of legal practice, which has caused the practical world to lose respect for theories and theoretical work. To change this situation requires the realization that the discussion of values, ideas and principles must be directed towards practice, especially practical difficulties, rather than simply a theory-to-theory response. Theory must be informed in order to be effective in developing and contributing to the formation of practical solutions, and to bridge the gap with practice while moving beyond operational solutions. The lack of theoretical preparedness that we have shown in some major areas of legal practice or reform is also often due to insufficient empirical research focused on practice.

But the difficulty is how can the world be perceived and explained? This is the first question facing the development and construction of effective practical legal theory. What this paper tries to explain is to enter the "field" of law——the place where the law exists, operates or exerts its influence, so that legal research can break through intellectual isolation and legal theory can have a practical standpoint and direction. The goal of entering the "field" is to form a clear grasp of the phenomena and facts, to make an in-depth examination of the conditions, logic and significance of the events and actions, as well as the position of the law in the society, and to have a true qualitative grasp of the actual operation of the law and the system. Such research cannot be separated from the intervention of anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology and other disciplines, and it is impossible for the researcher to rely on the internal knowledge of the law or dogma in isolation to explain the dynamic and complex operation of the law. Further, the discoveries made in the "field" also provide different theoretical perspectives with a "common world". Simply put, legal reality is there, it is present, and it can become a common problem for different legal theories. This makes it possible to achieve a real dialogue between different legal theories, which may or may not be able to be integrated, but even if they are divergent, they can at least clearly show the differences in values or positions. Therefore, entering the "field" is not simply an empirical or sensual experience, nor is it anti-theoretical. It is a position for the development of legal theory. This position emphasizes that theoretical explanations should be based on a grasp of the actual situation, and that theories should have clear objects and problems. The construction, development and revision of theory need to be based on empirical research, and theory can be discussed, tested and revised. This position rejects empty, factless and unreflective theories that do not search for meaning, and favors a commitment to enhancing the validity and practicality of legal theory.

2. Why does legal research need to go into the "field"?

2.1 Substantive knowledge and diversity issues in legal studies

Law is the rule-based, doctrinaire result of the experience and wisdom of the State and society in solving various problems, and is gradually accumulated through trial and error. It is because of this characteristic of law that conventional legal practice is able to solve most of the important problems of society. Normative jurisprudence advocates solving problems within legal norms and legal systems because of the assumption of the correctness and validity of the experience and wisdom embedded in these laws. However, modern societies have become more complex than ever before, and the law regulates all aspects of social life more comprehensively, directly and deeply. Against this background, the appropriateness of past experience and solutions to problems becomes a big question. In other words, the law is often wrong. Keeping a vigilant eye on the law becomes essential. More than ever, we need to ask what the law should be, how it can deal with complicated matters and social relations, and whether the law contributes to a good order of life or establishes a destructive force, and so on. Answering these questions obviously requires some substantial knowledge or reflection——on life, on society itself, and on its relation to the law. And all the insights about this do not come only from the law itself.

The troubles that the law brings to the living world have their origin in the absence of legislation, too much legislation or improper legislation, and manifest themselves in the process of implementing the law. And the greatest difficulty in legislating and improving the legal system is not a matter of the writing and logic of the text. Normative jurisprudence has provided us with the best training for mastering precise legal writing, and the real difficulty comes from a lack of substantive knowledge and understanding of the problems and objects for which legislation is intended. This does not mean that legislators or researchers have to acquire a knowledge of what is true and what is false about things, but rather an understanding of the principles by which things occur and their social significance. The acquisition of such substantive knowledge is directly related to whether we base legislation or policy adjustments on proper understanding. For example, if we want to regulate religion by means of law, the legislator should not only rely on the craft of legislation, but should also understand beliefs "in relation to each other and in relation to other social facts". That is, the legislator does not need to know the truth or falsity of the worldview offered by religion, but should understand the form of religion, how it operates and influences people's lives and worldviews. In reality, legislation and policies are often not shaped in a satisfactory manner, which is rooted in our lack of substantive knowledge about the problem, the object of the legislation or policy, and the result is that the law can not achieve the expected goal. In the field of legislation, procedures and mechanisms such as expert consultation, public consultation, etc. have been developed to obtain some of the substantive knowledge required for legislation, which to a certain extent compensates for the lack of intellectual knowledge of legislators. In contrast, in the field of legal research, the neglect of substantive knowledge beyond the teachings of the law by the researcher is more pronounced. This has led to researchers already blithely asserting how the law should treat the world when they do not know what the world is like. Indeed, to gain substantive knowledge and seek answers to questions, researchers need to understand how and why human behavior occurs and its nature, which requires access to the 'field'. Of course, entering the "field" does not necessarily mean that answers can be obtained, and seeing a phenomenon is not the same as being able to understand it. The answers depend on the use of the social sciences to discover.

The study of law requires not only substantive knowledge but also an appreciation of the complexity and diversity of social life. This may seem somewhat contrary to the purpose of law. One of the functions of law is to make the complexity of the world and social relations predictable and graspable, a simplification of a complex system of life. However, we must note that the diversity of cultures and lives is a factual existence and that there is a great tension between it and the law as an extension of the universal order. China is a large country in the true sense of the word, and the tension that may exist between the unity of the national legal system and the diversity of society is a critical issue that must be constantly confronted and dealt with in the construction of the rule of law. If we fail to grasp the relationship between the universality of the law and the diversity of society and culture, and simplify what cannot be simplified and does not need to be simplified or intrude excessively into the society, the law may meet with failure, and may instead lead to a world with more law but less order. From this perspective, the prerequisite for law to extend universal order and succeed is precisely the knowledge and understanding of the diversity of cultures and lives. To put it bluntly, a grasp of universality comes from an insight into diversity. Knowing and grasping diversity also implies access to the "field" in which law exists. Theoretical tools need to be linked to disciplines devoted to the study of cultural diversity and universality, such as anthropology.

In a nutshell, without a clear understanding of the issues and objects that legislation or the legal system will address, the law, rather than being effective in bringing about social change, will fail more often than not because it cannot position itself accurately. An understanding of the characteristics and limitations of law is therefore essential, and this needs to be calibrated and informed by the "field" in which the law interacts closely with the social sphere.

2.2 What kind of holistic and comparative perspectives are needed for legal studies?

In norm-centred jurisprudence, there has always been a doctrine of the holism of the legal system. The way forward in interpreting ambiguous provisions or resolving difficult cases from the perspective of legislative purpose is to expect the legislative purpose to govern the interpretation and application of the law, in an attempt to achieve consistency, certainty and stability of the law. The core of this is to obtain a holistic grasp of the legal text. This holism and the pursuit of coherence have important theoretical and practical significance for the practice of law as well as the coordination and coherence within the legal text, and play an important role in dealing with the internal structure and logical relationship of the legal system, as well as being an important technique of judicial adjudication. However, this kind of holistic theory is still mainly carried out within the legal text and system, which belongs to the "knowledge of operation technology". Therefore, it is not possible to understand the relationship between law and society theoretically, and it is difficult to deal with the challenges to law from the outside world, nor can it complete the external evaluation of law.

In contrast, Dworkin's approach of "law as a whole" is a huge breakthrough: "Judges who embrace the ideal of holistic interpretation seek to find the most rational and constructive interpretation of their society's political structure and legal doctrines in some coherent principle of civil rights and duties as a means of adjudicating difficult cases. They seek to make the best possible of a complex structure and record." Dworkin's theory of legal wholeness is both a principle of legislation and judicial adjudication, and is an important programme of political and legal practice. The central judgement of Dworkin's holistic theory is that "law is an interpretive concept", which emphasizes the centrality and role of "principles" in legal interpretation. The "principles" are not limited to legal texts and legal systems, but also include moral principles. Dworkin's holistic approach is remarkably open-ended, with a strategy of constructive interpretation of the law and the use of "principles" to ensure that the law is consistent both vertically and horizontally. The "principles" are given the function of responding to legal challenges arising from changes in the world, with the intention of making the law stable, coherent and not rigid. Dworkin's theory has important affinities with contemporary empiricist and continental hermeneutic philosophies, and encompasses the methodology of philosophy and social science in understanding the world. But the problem remains twofold. Firstly, in practice, it is difficult for legal practitioners to reach a consensus on "principles" or to achieve a coherent understanding of the law when there is a great deal of disruption in the internal relations of the law, especially in societies that lack a shared political philosophy. Secondly, although it is possible to develop an evaluation of legal practice along the lines of Dworkin's approach, it is not sufficient for an interpretative understanding of the operation of law. When we look at the operation of law in relation to society, Dworkin's theory is only one of a number of options for diagnosing legal practice, and there is a limited number of social science theories that can be applied. From this perspective, Dworkin's holistic theory focuses more on a constructive approach to the interpretation of law, which is more significant in its practical significance than in its explanatory value in the social sciences.

Here, it may be useful to take anthropology's holism as an example in order to demonstrate the differences between the holism of the social sciences and the holism of the legal field as mentioned earlier, and to see if some inspiration for legal research can be found in it? In addition to fieldwork, there are two distinctive aspects that make up the methodology that distinguishes anthropology from other social sciences: "(1) Looking at society as a whole in order to explore how each of the constituent elements of that society fits together or how these other elements make sense; (2) placing each society in connection with other societies for examination to discover similarities and differences and to account for them."

This holistic theory of anthropology has many different approaches and claims. However, as a foundational methodology for understanding societies, cultures or practices, its main thrust is to explore the relationships between things in an interconnected perspective. As Lewotin et al. put it, "According to the discursive perspective, the uniqueness of the part and the identity of the whole are mutually determined. Thus, human identity does not exist in isolation but emerges as a result of social life, yet the nature of this social life is in turn a consequence of our existence as human beings." This holistic theory emphasizes the relevance of the object of study in the socio-cultural vein to other factors or areas of society. This means that a researcher who seeks to understand a particular issue in a particular society needs to simultaneously understand the totality of social life that is connected to it or the worldview that guides people in their practice and cultural expression. Although it is impossible to achieve a complete understanding of the whole, it is possible to understand the object of research within a larger social context and historical and cultural context. When applied to the field of legal research, this holism focuses on explaining and resolving the relationship between law and the outside world, and on the revelation and interpretation of "facts". It means that the researcher has to examine the law in a larger context of life, to identify the relationship between law and society, culture and politics, and then to recognize and understand the law and the social significance of legal action. This approach offers the possibility of understanding and recognizing the specificity of law and its limitations.

In my opinion, the model of applying the holistic approach of social science to the diagnosis of the rule of law is Mr. Fei Xiaotong:

The current judicial system has had a very specific side effect in the countryside, by destroying the original order of propriety but failing to establish the rule of law. The establishment of the rule of law does not depend solely on the enactment of a number of legal provisions and the establishment of a number of courts, but also on how the people apply these devices. Further, there must first be some reforms in the social structure and the mindset. If these aspects are not reformed, and laws and courts are simply pushed into the countryside, the result will be that the benefits of the rule of law will not be realized, but the disadvantages of destroying the order of propriety will have already occurred.

What Mr. Faye describes is how laws that are inconsistent with the logic of village life, the social structure and these social foundations undermine the established informal control and order of the village. This diagnosis is based on the observation and study of the judicial system within the overall structure of village life. From Mr. Fei’s account, we can appreciate two points: first, the individualistic social structure and way of life against which modern law from the West is directed may function in the opposite way in a community-based society – destroying community life without building an individualistic society. Second, while the solution proposed by Mr. Fei is to transform the social structure and its associated conceptual system, the deeper significance is that the construction of the rule of law needs to take into account whether it is compatible with the social structure. Equally significant are the studies of contemporary rule of law by Su Li and Zhu Xiaoyang. Su Li’s study reveals the many gaps and tensions between the modernization of the rule of law and the composition of Chinese society, with a holistic diagnosis. Zhu Xiaoyang expands on this diagnosis by applying a holistic anthropological approach to the study of  a punitive event in a village, and the enforcement of grassland laws, etc.. The value of such studies is, as Hobel puts it, “We must understand society and culture well enough to discover the place of law in the total social structure. Before we can gain a comprehensive understanding of the question of what law is and how it works, we must have some idea of how society works.”

2.3 Whether legal study aims on rules or on people and their actions?

Law emerges to regulate human behavior and in this way to shape or maintain some kind of discipline. It appears in the form of rules, but it is directed towards human beings and their actions under the rules. Therefore, the so-called effectiveness of law points to whether the law can influence human action. However, mainstream legal study has mainly focused their research object on the rules of law themselves. As Karl Larenz points out, "We have defined jurisprudence as that which has as its main task to deal with the norms of law in a normative perspective; in other words, it is primarily intended to explore the 'meaning' of the norms. It is concerned with the normative validity of empirical law, the meaning content of norms, and the norms of judgment contained in court verdicts." This definition is a more explicitly juridical conception of the legal doctrinal analysis of law. According to this assertion, the core of legal study is "norms", and "legal norms" with formal validity. Legal positivism has been crucial to the development of jurisprudence, establishing " legal norms" as the objects of jurisprudential concern and thus generating the most important principles and methods of how to interpret and apply the law. However, this set of doctrines and methods, which take legal norms as the object of study, has its own specific functions and boundaries. It has obvious limitations in dealing with social issues of law and difficult cases. The limitations mentioned here are not entirely specific case processing problems, but more refers to this "normative jurisprudence" is difficult to effectively recognize, and understand how the law is practiced by its objects, and operators, and how the law functions through the actions of human beings by applying a dynamic perspective, and also difficult to fully understand the social impact and significance of the law. These limitations are precisely why the social science study of law is needed.

Further, as Bernd Ruthers puts it: "What is justice cannot be determined without combining the meanings of origin and future, of human birth and death". Here, scientific answers alone are not enough. In this respect, the law is inevitably founded on religion or 'worldview'." It is clear that a technical jurisprudential research program focused on textual writing, interpretation, and logical deduction cannot, on its own, offer suggestions as to where the law should go. Law's own "worldview" is not fundamentally derived from the text itself, but from the culture, society, and politics in which it exists.

However, it is difficult to study law in the context of society. To address this issue, it is first necessary to clarify the relationship between human action, law, culture and society. Culture and society are different forms of human existence and, as Geertz puts it: "Culture is the meaning  structure that human beings use to interpret their experiences and guide their actions; social structures are the forms that actions take, the networks of social relations that actually exist." These assertions about culture and society concentrate on the forms of human existence and focus on the relationship between culture, society and human behavior. Culture is a guide to action, and society is presented by action; abstract culture needs the study of action to come alive and to be presented and recognized. Grasping people's actions makes it possible to realize the purpose of studying law in the context of society and culture. The study of human beings and their actions is indispensable for a study of law that is directed towards social practice. At the same time, when we look at human beings and their actions, and place law in a social and cultural context, we inevitably find that we are in fact living in a three-dimensional space of "legal diversity", and that we are living and acting under a "legal network" of norms of different natures. 

In short, the operation of law is fundamentally the action of human beings, and how human beings act under the law, under the rules, determines the social consequences of the law. Thus, in the legal study, attention to human action, especially how people act under rules, helps to grasp the interaction of law with society and culture, and makes it possible to examine what kind of orders result from action. Effective and practical legal theory comes from an understanding of human relations, actions and their conditions that cannot be separated from practical field observations and theoretical analysis.

3. Where is the "field" of legal study?

3.1 The law creates the "other"

As Cotterell puts it, "one of the most important features of law is its intellectual isolation", and this "isolation" not only refers to the apparently closed nature of the legal system, but can also be extended to mean that the law is the product of a kind of elitist knowledge. There is often a discrepancy between this knowledge and the sense of justice and the daily practice of ordinary people who are "laymen" of the law. This is because the modern state must construct norms - the law of the state - that transcend a specific place and time. And, along with the confidence and ambition of politicians and the legal profession, the law has moved away from the society it once inhabited. The estrangement of law from society has become evident and a source of crisis for the rule of law. Compared with the elite in legal research and practice, the worldview and legal view of the general public may be far removed from the so-called "spirit of law" or the ideal of the rule of law. The "layman" or grass-roots practitioner of the law undoubtedly constitutes what anthropology calls the "other", and jurists and legal elites often overlook the objects to which the law is directed and the people who are affected by it.

Legal elites often misinterpret the legal practices of ordinary people. As in one famous case, the elite touted a farmer who went to court and used DNA technology to resolve a dispute over cattle ownership as an example of "the conscious use of the law to safeguard legitimate rights and interests." In fact, however, it is the logic of rural life that drives the two farmers to go to court. The essence of this sensational legal event is nothing more than the expression of rural culture. This situation undoubtedly shows that there is a huge gap between the "knowledge" of the elites and the "common sense" of the ordinary people, just like the Qiu Ju and the judicial personnel in the eyes of Professor Su Li.

The value of effective theories often lies in "daring to deny generally accepted ideas". Legal study should reveal legal practices that are different from general ideas and theoretical imagination, and discover daily life that is different from legal texts and "law in action" that takes place in it, including unknown legal practices in the field of legal profession. Our encounter with law may not be more violent than the law of "laymen". In the field of legal study, the "self" and "the other" can be defined and understood constantly. So far, we can say that “the other" in legal study is the undertaker of the law and all kinds of people who use and practice the law in various forms. This understanding determines how we define the "field" of legal study.

3.2 The ubiquitous fields

As mentioned earlier, “field” and “the other” are linked together. For legal study, one should have an imaginative understanding of what "field" is, rather than being limited to the early anthropological definition of "field".

If we define "the other" in legal study as those who practice and undertake the law, it means that all fields where legal practice exists may become fields of legal study. “The law itself is a form of social control, but there are other forms of social control that exist in social life, such as in family, friendship, neighborhood relationships, villages, tribes, professions, organizations, and various groups.” Where social control exists, there exists a relationship between law and society. Therefore, the "field" of law is infinitely vast. If we narrowly understand the field research of law as only studying customary/folk laws in simple society, rural society, or ethnic minority society, it would be like drawing a circle on the ground to serve as a prison. In fact, legal study conducted through field investigations has expanded its scope to various fields of life in different societies, covering issues such as human rights, court operations, multinational corporations, and globalization.

Of course, finding the "field" of law does not mean that we can effectively examine it. In the case of legal anthropology, for example, the important means of research are the method of extension of case and process-event research methods, this two interrelated approaches enable anthropology to fully realize ethnographic writing of law. I am not saying that the study of legal anthropology relies only on these two methods, on the contrary, other research methods of anthropology can also be applied to the study of law, I just think that these two methods have the meaning of "dominance".

The misunderstanding that must be avoided is that field research or field investigations are only exclusive to anthropology. Entering the "field" is an important way to obtain practical analysis objects. This is an experiential approach to the development of legal theory, and its significance and value are to enable different approaches to legal theory to obtain a "common world" that can be analyzed simultaneously. The analysis and development of theory itself is not limited to anthropology, and the intervention of disciplines such as economics, sociology, and psychology will be greatly beneficial. If different legal theories have a 'shared world', Posner's statement of 'the possibility of legal theory as a unified field of social science' truly becomes possible.

3.3 Writing in the Field of Law

How to conduct field research and writing requires attention to three interrelated issues:

Firstly, empirical oriented legal research does not necessarily mean that theory holds a secondary position in research. Some legal researchers, including some anthropological researchers, often have cognitive biases in the issue of experience and theory, believing that field investigations are just a discovery and description of "facts", and misunderstandings about "value neutrality", believing that conducting field investigations does not require theoretical preparation. However, as Chen Qingde pointed out, "The difference between the real object and the cognitive object clearly indicates that the production process of human knowledge always follows a certain cognitive 'method', relying on the concepts and categories provided by the theoretical framework to grasp the real object." Humans have various ways or frameworks to recognize the world, such as religion, art, etc. However, for scholars, theory is the most important framework and way to master the world. On the issue of theory and experience, it is worth remembering Merton's teachings: "We do not like sociologists who only talk without observation, or only observe without thinking, or only think without subjecting their ideas to systematic empirical research." Good fieldworkers will also be the interpreters and creators of theories.

It is precisely due to the close connection between experience and theory, as well as the tension between the two, that field investigations and ethnographic writing practices have been constantly changing to adapt to the diverse and changing social life. As mentioned earlier, 'field' has been widely involved in different societies and fields, and its theory can therefore continuously gain nutrients and develop.

Secondly, it must be recognized that good field writing is based on a clear presentation and description of important facts, details, processes, and backgrounds. In other words, the value and function of "narration" should not be underestimated or belittled. Effective narration allows readers to understand the process of how researchers make inferences and judgments. And provide readers and later researchers with an empirical material foundation for discussion, comparison, and criticism. Effective field writing also makes it meaningful for researchers from different disciplines and perspectives to debate the same event or issue.

Thirdly, based on the first two points, a higher requirement is that empirically oriented research and writing must also be reflective. At an earlier stage, anthropology and sociology were considered to be about the "real" reproduction of society and culture. In a long series of criticisms and reflections on traditional ethnographic writing since Malinowski, we find that the culture and society presented and interpreted by ethnographic writing cannot be objective, neutral, or truthful in the way that the natural sciences present them, because behind every text there are personal styles, values, and other important contexts of the writers, and what is presented can never be "all there is," there is always something that is "true. What is presented can never be all there is, and there is always something that "gets" lost. This may seem contrary to what we understand by 'science', but this criticism does not detract from the practice and value of field research and ethnographic writing. There is no need to argue that the presentation of cultures and societies can never be completely true and complete. The question is what we can present, what we can explain, and why. That is to say, the key is what questions we are trying to answer and why. Inspired by Santos, I think it's very interesting that both legal field research and its writing are remarkably similar to cartography, he says: Law is a map. A map is a distortion of the regularization of reality, an organized and distorted reading of an area that creates a plausible false image of its counterpart. By imagining that the real imaginary counterpart is transformed into a practical orientation, this is in line with William James's maxim that 'what counts will be counted'. Like maps, laws are a distortion or misinterpretation of the regularization of the social sphere ...... In practice, a map cannot be identical to reality point by point ...... Mapmaking involves the filtering of details, "the selection of important details and relevant features."

Santos' comparison of law and cartography is highly inspiring. Law can be considered a guide for behavior and relationships, ethnography is a catalog or picture of culture, and maps are indicators of terrain and locations. All three aim to present something that exists in reality, providing guidance to help people understand or take action. The most significant commonality among these three is that they do not present reality in its entirety but offer a limited representation. The effectiveness and utility of this representation depend not on complete accuracy but on our purposes and how we position these three entities.

Though there are still intense debates and various viewpoints, the undeniable value of fieldwork lies in revealing "the true value of the theoretical process, perhaps in the continuous self-critique that it brings." In other words, a research approach that emphasizes the researcher's empathetic experience is particularly valuable. The worth of this empirical research comes from its ability to provide explanations, understanding, theoretical reflection, and argumentation about the issues and our thought patterns.

The relationship between ethnographic writing, fieldwork, and theoretical reflection has significant implications for legal studies. It is built on the tension between experience and theory, as well as an understanding of the value of theory. I believe that "continuous observation - amending existing theories and systems - proposing new theories and systems should be a cyclical process of theory production." This is essential when studying law, as it involves going back to the "background" of legal texts and the social purposes of law. A danger of law in society is that "law distorts reality to establish exclusivity. For example, in the case of the law, without considering the diversity of normative commands operating in society, each branch of law seeks exclusivity and monopolistic control over social behavior in its legal domain. This is most evident in the case of national law." In other words, law may possess a repressive or arbitrary quality, ignoring or misinterpreting reality. This not only fails to establish a just order but can lead to chaos in people's lives. Just as a bad map can get you lost, bad law can make life worse.

The significance of reflexivity lies in gaining a profound understanding of the daily practice of law as a subject of theoretical inquiry, to critically examine "bad law." In a context of theoretical awareness, it becomes essential to discover voices and facts hidden by "common sense" or elite legal discourse and uncover the injustices created by law to challenge and amend existing theories. Only in this way can Western theories or the history of the rule of law cease to be a dominant force and become the object of critique, examination, comparison, and absorption through local observations. Based on reflection and critique of reality and experience, this is a way to foster theoretical development.

4.Discussion: what the concept of "the field" ?

Whether legal research needs to enter "the field" fundamentally depends on what "the field" can bring to legal research and the development of effective practical legal theories. The core question is: What does "the field" contain? An exemplary study in this regard is "Order Without Law." The author of this book, based on solid field research, employed anthropological methods for describing and presenting phenomena. They also used a combination of legal sociology and legal economics for analysis, constructing a universal theory of human cooperation. This exemplary study highlights the importance of "the field" in its openness – legal practices occur there, and facts and issues are readily available for researchers to adopt different approaches to theoretical analysis and construction. If different researchers and legal theory approaches can confront the real-world issues head-on, grounding their analytical work in legal practice, it becomes possible to analyze and construct theories effectively. In this context, we can examine what "the field" contains from at least five perspectives: 

① Diverse Methods: "The field" can accommodate a variety of research methods. While field research has its origins in anthropology, the specific research methods, such as how to approach problems and subjects, how to reveal phenomena and form theoretical insights, are not exclusive to anthropology. The key to academic research is genuinely engaging with and delving into the issues, and the methods can be diverse. Thus, it can encompass qualitative research, quantitative investigations, or a combination of both, depending on the research question at hand. Different methodological tools can be applied in fieldwork. 

② Diverse Theories: The effectiveness of gaining true insights and developing new theoretical advances in the field depends on the theoretical tools for analyzing field data. Theoretical approaches and tools can be diverse. From the perspective of the relationship between other disciplines and anthropology, it's evident that different theoretical analytical approaches can be applied to the same data, resulting in different utilities. For instance, many theories in institutional economics originate from the analysis of anthropological field data, and analyses of legal and societal issues often incorporate various disciplinary theories. Therefore, "the field" accommodates various scientific theories, providing opportunities for the development of different legal theories. 

③ Diverse Perspectives: The way legal practices are observed and analyzed, similar to photography, can vary depending on one's perspective. Good research can combine descriptions and analyses, macro and micro views, subjective and objective dimensions, institutional and environmental factors, among others. Alternatively, due to the different perspectives of researchers, when we put their "pictures" together, we obtain a combined perspective. It's akin to a group of blind people describing an elephant and eventually gaining a complete understanding of it. 

④ Comparative Research: In the field of legal studies, the challenge of comparative research doesn't lie in citing written rules or languages but in whether one can gain substantial insights into a particular issue or field through comparison and develop general theories. In an influential paper, Moore proposed a process-based and holistic comparative approach to social sciences based on field research. In some neighboring fields, it's clear that examining a sufficient number of specific cases can lead to the development of comparative and general insights and theories. In legal research, accumulating enough cases through field research is significant for presenting China's experiences and forming general theories on certain important issues. 

⑤ The Effectiveness of Theoretical Debates: Theoretical debates typically fall into three scenarios: In the first, debaters do not actually address a common subject, lacking a "common  world" to refer to, and their arguments are disjointed. In the second, debaters share a common subject, rely on roughly similar facts, but differ in their value judgments of the facts, involving differences in worldviews. The third scenario occurs when debaters share a "common world," allowing them to modify their observations and theories through theoretical debates, leading to theoretical communication and integration. The worst-case scenario is the first one because it doesn't contribute to knowledge. The ideal situation is the third, indicating consensus building. The second scenario also qualifies as a meaningful argument because it clarifies the source of disagreement, even if worldviews are hard to reconcile, at least making the reasons for the differences clear and distinguishing different perspectives. In all three cases, "the field" plays a role in enabling debates to be grounded in a common foundation, avoiding the worst-case scenario, and promoting the development and formation of theories through effective debates.

The original text was published in the second issue of Law and Social Development in 2017 and was sourced from the WeChat public account "Frontiers of Legal Studies."