[author]Ruan Shenyu
[content]
The Dual Structure of PI Rights
Ruan Shenyu
Lecturer at Law School of Renmin University of China
Abstract: The rights to personal information (PI) have two distinct aspects: absolute and relative rights. Before PI is processed, an individual has the same legal status as an owner of their PI, which is akin to an absolute right. However, this legal status is not explicitly defined as a subjective right by the law. Once the PI is processed, the rights of individuals in personal information processing activities belong to relative rights． While the relative right to personal information is predefined by law, it still allows for private autonomy, giving the individual the ability to negotiate with the processor regarding other relative rights. Understanding the dual structure of PI rights can aid in constructing separate remedy mechanisms. The absolute right to PI can be protected by damages and actionegatoria, while the relative right requires the processor to provide positive payment. When the processor refuses to perform, fails to fully perform, or delays in performance, the relevant provisions on liability for breach of contract can be applied by analogy.
Key Words: Personal Information; Absolute Right; Relative Right; Distinction of Interests and Rights
1 Question raising
In the field of private law, the nature of personal information rights has always been a dispute between civil rights and civil interests. For example, one view holds that personal information rights are absolute rights, including legal powers such as the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to delete. Another viewpoint holds that personal information rights are not absolute rights, but civil interests protected by law. Rights such as the right to access and copy all belong to the power of personal information rights. A similar viewpoint holds that the rights enjoyed by individuals, such as the right to access and copy, are essentially the concretization of the right to stop infringement, eliminate obstacles, and eliminate danger of personality rights. Therefore, they belong to the right to request personality rights, and their relationship with personal information rights is the relationship between the right to defense requests and initial rights. Regardless of whether personal information rights and interests are civil rights or civil interests, the above viewpoints collectively believe that there is only one initial type of personal information rights and interests in China's legal system, The "rights of individuals in personal information processing activities" stipulated in Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Personal Information Protection Law") can be absorbed or derived from this initial personal information rights. For the convenience of writing, this article refers to this perspective as the "monistic construction theory of personal information rights".
The monistic construction theory of personal information rights faces the following problems: firstly, the realization of rights such as the right to access and copy requires the active response of specific processors, and therefore belongs to the right of request or relative rights. If personal information rights are defined as absolute rights, why does it include legal powers with relative rights attributes? Secondly, if personal information rights and interests are defined as civil interests, how can they cover more effective "rights" such as the right to access and copy? Thirdly, the right to request personal rights is premised on the infringement or obstruction of personal rights, but the right to access and copy is not premised on the infringement of personal information rights, and there is an undeniable difference between the two. It can be seen that the current monistic construction theory of personal information rights cannot explain some phenomena of personal information rights. In order to better integrate personal information rights into the civil rights system, it is necessary to conduct a theoretical analysis of the construction of personal information rights.
This article will analyze personal information rights from the perspective of formal effectiveness. The formal Wirkungen of rights refers to the legal effect generated by a right (and a civil interest protected by law), which is a directional obligation imposed on others (one or several people or anyone). In terms of formal effectiveness, there are significant differences between absolute rights and relative rights: firstly, there are different numbers of obligors. The obligors of absolute rights are not specific to anyone, while the obligors of relative rights are specific to one or more individuals. The second is that the content of directional obligations is different. The directional obligation contained in absolute power always has a negative characteristic, which requires others not to interfere with specific types of things or status; The directional obligations contained in relative rights can be both positive and negative obligations. In traditional civil law, the significance of distinguishing absolute rights from relative rights lies in the different relief mechanisms. On the one hand, when absolute rights are infringed upon, the relevant provisions of the Tort Liability Law are usually applicable. On the other hand, the legal systems of various countries usually do not provide general provisions for relative rights and their relief mechanisms, but instead prescribe creditor's rights as a model of relative rights. When relative rights are violated, relevant provisions on creditor's rights and their liability for breach of contract can be referred to. The inviolability of creditor's rights and the phenomenon of relative rights such as the property rights of creditor's rights having effects on the world, although to some extent blurring the boundary between absolute rights and relative rights, these phenomena are not related to the main idea of this article. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some legal phenomena related to personal information rights, and absolute and relative rights are still ideal analytical tools overall.
This article will propose a "binary construction theory of personal information rights" from the perspective of formal effectiveness, that is, there are two initial types of personal information rights in China's legal system: one is the absolute right of personal information. Before personal information is processed, individuals have a legal status similar to absolute rights over personal information, which regulates the legal relationship between individuals and any unspecified processor. The other is the relative right of personal information. After the processing of personal information, the rights of individuals in personal information processing activities belong to corresponding rights, which regulate the legal relationship between individuals and specific processors. These two legal statuses are both concrete expressions of the concept of information self-determination in statutory law. They are independent and have different legal effects, but they are not mutually exclusive. Individuals often enjoy both absolute and relative rights to personal information. The benefit of clarifying the dual structure of personal information rights lies in the ability to construct different relief mechanisms based on the differences between absolute and relative rights.
2 Personal information rights as absolute rights
2.1 Disputes over the Differentiation of Rights and Interests in Personal Information
According to Article 1035, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Code) and Article 13, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Personal Information Protection Law, the processing of personal information shall obtain personal consent. According to this regulation, individuals have the authority to agree or refuse processors to process their personal information before it is processed for a specific purpose. This legal status imposes a directive obligation on any processor in the world: the processor shall not process personal information without consent (unless the processor enjoys other legal foundations). Therefore, before personal information is processed, the legal status enjoyed by individuals regarding their personal information is universal and can confront any processor who may engage in personal information processing activities.
In terms of worldliness, the legal status enjoyed by individuals before their personal information is processed is very similar to typical absolute rights such as ownership, right to life, right to body, and right to health. According to Article 240 of the Civil Code, the owner of the property can exclude all interference from others. According to Article 1002-1004 of the Civil Code, "no organization or individual" shall infringe upon the right to life, body, and health of others. These typical absolute rights also impose directional obligations on anyone else. Of course, the exclusive nature of universal rights is not absolute, and some legal positions, although not stipulated as“ ×× Right ", but they still have universality. For example, Article 9 of the Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that operators shall not infringe on trade secrets in specific ways, where "operator" refers to an unspecified operator rather than a specific operator. Article 1010 of the Civil Code stipulates that sexual harassment of others shall not be carried out, and it is any person in the world who may violate this obligation, rather than a specific person or persons. Although these legal positions are not absolute rights, they also impose directional obligations on unspecified third parties. The legal status enjoyed by individuals regarding their personal information before it is processed is also the same.
Before personal information is processed, individuals have a legal status that is relevant to the world and always face disputes over "absolute rights" and "civil interests". Firstly, it should be clarified that the debate on the distinction of rights and interests in personal information is not simply a descriptive issue regarding whether China's legal system provides for a "personal information right". Otherwise, this debate will end with the promulgation of the Civil Code and the Personal Information Protection Law, as no law uses the legal concept of "personal information right". The debate on whether personal information rights and interests are absolute rights or civil interests is not about the formal debate of the title of rights, but rather a substantive debate in the context of tort law: from the perspective of tort law protection, should personal information rights and interests be classified as absolute rights or civil interests.
The dispute over the division of rights and interests in personal information is to some extent influenced by the "division of rights theory" in German tort law. German tort law distinguishes between absolute rights and civil interests, and assigns different protection modes to the two. In detail, according to Articles 823 and 826 of the German Civil Code, the typical absolute rights of life, body, health, freedom, and ownership are fully protected by law; Whether other interests are protected by law depends on whether the perpetrator has violated protective laws or intentionally violated good customs, and in specific cases, interest measurement is often necessary. Based on this, there seems to be a clear boundary between typical absolute rights and civil interests. As long as a civil interest can be elevated to "other rights" in Article 823 (1) of the German Civil Code, it can enjoy superior legal protection.
Affected by this, some scholars argue that China's tort law should also adopt the theory of distinction of rights and interests, and only the rights clearly defined in China's civil law are absolute rights, which can enjoy superior legal protection. As for other rights, they are all civil interests and receive weaker legal protection. According to this version of the theory of distinction of rights and interests, as neither the Personal Information Protection Law nor the Civil Code provides for "personal information rights," personal information can only be protected by tort law as a civil interest. However, this formalist approach may not operate smoothly in China's legal system. Some legal positions that are defined as absolute rights by China's statutory laws may not be fully protected like the absolute rights listed in Article 823 (1) of the German Civil Code. For example, the right to reputation belongs to absolute rights rather than civil interests in China's legal system. However, from Articles 1025 and 998 of the Civil Code, it can be seen that if the perpetrator engages in news reporting, public opinion supervision, and other activities for the public interest that affect the reputation of the victim, whether the act constitutes an infringement of the right to reputation or not, it is necessary to resort to interest measurement in specific cases. Although the right of reputation has the name of absolute right, it is more like civil interest in the protection of tort law. Therefore, whether a legal status is absolute right or civil interest in the context of tort law cannot be simply judged from a positivist standpoint of statutory law.
2.2 Reflection on the Theory of Differentiation of Rights and Interests
Both absolute rights and civil interests play a normative role in the context of tort law in essentially the same way. On the one hand, the normative feature of absolute power is manifested in its exclusive function. As early as 1910, German scholar v. Tuhr pointed out that absolute power regards legal interests as objects exclusively controlled by the subject of the right, and prohibits any behavior that infringes on that domain of control. If others violate the order prohibiting infringement, they will be liable for damages. In other words, for non rights holders, absolute power is a collection of orders prohibiting infringement. This concept continues to this day, forming the "die Ausschlussfoundation" of absolute rights in German tort law today. On the other hand, civil interests also have an exclusive function. For example, Article 1010 of the Civil Code aims to protect the personal dignity of individuals related to sex, rather than a specific personal right. For the purpose of protection, this article prohibits others from engaging in sexual harassment through language, text, images, physical behavior, etc. This reflects the exclusive function of personal dignity related to sex. In this article, the author uses "directive obligation" to express the exclusive function of a legal status. In other words, the normative feature of a legal status is reflected in the imposition of directional obligations by that legal status on others (one or several people or anyone).
In the context of tort law, the reason why a legal status plays a normative role is that it imposes a directional obligation on others, because when others violate this directional obligation, it will constitute an infringement of the legal status. Professor Cheng Xiao believes that "the element of infringing on the civil rights and interests of others means that whether the civil rights and interests enjoyed by the victim are obtained through the mode of empowerment norms or generated through the mode of behavioral norms, the perpetrator has a corresponding obligation to not act. Any infringement of civil rights and interests is related to the breach of the perpetrator's obligations." According to this viewpoint, the element of infringement of rights and interests is equivalent to the breach of directional obligations by others. Similarly, Professor Zhu Hu pointed out in his analysis of the normative characteristics of personality rights that the normative significance of Article 991 of the Civil Code is that "the act of infringing on personality rights is a directional error, therefore, not only should the infringer bear public law responsibility, but also private law responsibility towards the subject of the infringed personality rights". The "directional error" refers to the behavior or state of others violating directional obligations, and directional errors will result in tort liability in private law.
The traditional theory of distinguishing rights and interests holds that there is a clear boundary between absolute rights and civil interests. Absolute power has a comprehensive exclusive function, and its fundamental feature is to exclude any illegal interference from other subjects. In contrast, the directional obligations imposed by civil interests on others are relatively vague, and it is often necessary to weigh interests in specific cases. However, this binary opposition simplifies the problem. Firstly, the two framework rights of general personality rights and business rights developed by German precedents, although included in the "other rights" of Article 823 (1) of the German Civil Code, still differ from typical absolute rights - infringement of general personality rights or business rights cannot be inferred as the illegality of the injurious act, and judges always need to repeatedly resort to interest measurement to determine whether the perpetrator needs to bear tort liability. Secondly, typical absolute rights such as ownership should have enjoyed comprehensive protection, but in practice, vague areas have also emerged. Damaging or taking away someone else's property constitutes an infringement of their ownership, but does taking photos of someone else's property without authorization infringe on their ownership? To what extent does the obstruction of the use function of ownership constitute an infringement of ownership? These questions cannot be simply answered based on the fact that ownership is a typical absolute right listed in Article 823 (1) of the German Civil Code. Finally, with the development of precedents and theories, there are also some personality rights in general personality rights that have such a clear structure that as long as the behavior performed by others meets the constitutive requirements of relevant norms, it can be inferred that the behavior is illegal. Some personality rights with unclear structures will gradually become clear with the accumulation of precedents, ultimately exhibiting the attribute of absolute rights. Therefore, Professor Larentz believes that the distinction between absolute rights and civil interests is only quantitative, not qualitative. It can be seen that the relationship between absolute rights and civil interests is not completely binary, but rather gradual and excessive.
This article argues that since absolute rights and civil interests play a normative role by imposing directional obligations on others, it is necessary to determine whether a legal status is closer to absolute rights or closer to civil interests based on whether the directional obligations imposed on others by that legal status are clear. In other words, in the spectrum of gradual transition from civil interests to absolute rights, as the directional obligations imposed by a legal status on others become clearer, the legal status is closer to the end of absolute rights. On the contrary, if the directional obligation imposed by a legal status on others is not clear, then it is closer to the end of the civil interest. Whether the directional obligation of a legal status is clear depends to some extent on the explicit provisions of the statutory law on the directional obligation, rather than whether the statutory law names a legal status as“ ×× Right. When the statutory provisions on the directional obligation of a legal status are sufficiently clear, the judge should first follow the meaning of the statutory provisions, that is, any violation of the directional obligation should be considered as an infringement of the legal status, without considering whether the legal status is defined as“ ×× Right "is still just a civil interest.
2.3 Absolute right to personal information
Based on the above discussion, whether personal information rights and interests are protected by absolute rights or by civil interests in the context of tort law cannot be simply judged based on whether the statute stipulates "personal information rights", but rather depends on whether the directive obligations imposed by the statute on unspecified processors are clear. According to this standard, although the Personal Information Protection Law and the Civil Code do not define personal information rights as“ ×× However, due to the fact that personal information rights impose such clear directional obligations on non-specific processors, the legal status enjoyed by individuals before personal information is processed is closer to the end of absolute rights.
Firstly, according to Article 1035 (1) (1) of the Civil Code and Article 13 (1) (1). These provisions indicate that when faced with personal information, processors are first bound by a relatively clear directive obligation not to process the personal information of others without consent. Professor Zhang Xinbao believes that "individuals have the right to agree (or refuse) processors to process their personal information, which reflects their control over their personal information. This dominance reflects respect and maintenance of individual self-determination, while also endowing individuals with a legal status that is very similar to typical absolute rights regarding their personal information. Ownership is the most typical absolute right, imposing a directive obligation on others in the world not to interfere without consent. Personal information rights in fact also impose a similar directive obligation on any potential processor. However, compared to ownership, the uniqueness of personal information rights lies in: firstly, in ownership, anyone else in the world is bound by the obligation not to interfere; However, in the field of personal information rights, only the specific type of subject, the personal information processor, is bound by the obligation not to process. Secondly, in ownership, no one shall interfere in any way with anything exclusively belonging to the owner; However, in the field of personal information rights, only when the processor processes personal information for reasons other than personal or family affairs, they are bound by the obligation not to process it. However, these differences are not substantive and will not change the fact that the personal information rights stipulated by statute impose a directive obligation on unspecified processors, that is, they are not allowed to process the personal information of others without consent. It is precisely this universally applicable directional obligation that gives personal information rights a legal status similar to absolute rights. In contrast, the model bill voted by the United States Uniform Law Commission, the Uniform Personal Data Protection Act, allows processors to process personal information in principle, with only a few exceptions prohibiting processing activities. In this legislative plan, the legal status enjoyed by individuals before their personal information was processed is far from absolute rights.
Secondly, although Article 13 (1) (2-7) of the Personal Information Protection Law provides for several exceptions that do not require consent, this does not affect the conclusion that personal information rights are more like absolute rights. On the one hand, absolute rights can coexist with the system of fair use. For example, Article 10 of the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates exclusive rights such as reproduction rights, rental rights, exhibition rights, etc. Article 24 of the law allows others to use a work reasonably without permission or payment to the copyright owner. For example, the personality rights section of the Civil Code stipulates absolute rights such as the right to name and portrait, but Article 999 of the law also stipulates that others can reasonably use names and portraits for public interest purposes such as news reporting and public opinion supervision. Therefore, absolute rights can complement the fair use system to achieve a balance between personal rights protection and the free flow of information. The same applies to the provisions of Article 13, Paragraph 1, Items 2-7 of the Personal Information Protection Law. Although these provisions to some extent exempt processors from the obligation to process personal information without authorization, these exceptions are rare and their application scenarios are relatively clear. Therefore, judges do not need to conduct extensive interest assessments when determining whether the processor's unauthorized processing activities infringe on personal information rights. Therefore, these exceptions do not undermine the legal nature of personal information rights as absolute rights. On the other hand, although Article 13 (1) of the Personal Information Protection Law sets personal consent in parallel with other legal foundations, it is generally believed that personal consent holds a core position in personal information processing rules. The structure of using personal consent as a principle and other legal foundations as exceptions has already stated that the processor should be bound by the obligation not to be dealt with in principle, and can only be exempted in exceptional circumstances. In this sense, the exception provided for in Article 13 (1) of the Personal Information Protection Law will not change the status of personal information rights as absolute rights.
3 Personal information rights as relative rights
3.1 Personal information relative rights
After personal information is processed for a specific purpose and the processing activities are still ongoing, individuals enjoy the "personal rights in personal information processing activities" stipulated in Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law, including the right to know, the right to make decisions, the right to restrict or refuse processing, the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, the right to delete, and other rights. Some scholars have noticed that these rights enjoyed by individuals can only be exercised by the processors who actually process their personal information, and are "essentially a right of request, not an absolute right". Indeed, the formal validity of these rights is different from the absolute right to personal information. One reason is that the number of obligors varies: these rights can only be exercised by processors who have actually processed personal information, and therefore obligors are specific. The second is the difference in the content of rights: these rights require the processor to fulfill the obligation of active action, rather than the obligation of passive inaction. This article collectively refers to these rights as "personal information relative rights".
In the monistic construction theory of personal information rights, the relative right of personal information is either absorbed into personal information rights as a legal power of personal information rights, or defined as a remedial claim right of personal information rights. However, both views are inappropriate.
On the one hand, the legal power contained in the absolute right of personal information cannot include relative rights. This is because: firstly, the so-called power refers to the legal possibility that a single right can contain but does not have independent status. As pointed out above, the defining feature of absolute right is that the obligor is not specific, and the content always requires the obligor to passively refrain from acting. Therefore, an absolute right should not include the power to demand active action from others, otherwise it will violate the defining characteristics of absolute right. Of course, 'power' is not a legal concept but a theoretical concept, and may have different meanings. Some scholars also define the right to relief based on this right as the power of this right. If defined according to this definition, the viewpoint of defining the right to access and copy as the right to personal information rights is essentially the same as the viewpoint of defining it as a remedial claim right. The following text will point out that there are also shortcomings in this viewpoint. Secondly, the reason why absolute power should not contain the power to demand positive action from others is because such power will impose a directional obligation of positive action on anyone other than the right holder. Such absolute power will bring great uncertainty to social interaction, and people may face commands from a stranger at any time requesting them to take some positive action. There may be opposition opinions that not all claims are relative rights, such as the right to claim property rights, which are absolute rights. Although the rights enjoyed by individuals in handling activities are expressed in the form of "having the right to request/demand", they may belong to absolute rights like property rights claims. Indeed, prior to the occurrence of obstruction or danger, the right to claim property rights may be concealed and may be claimed against any potential obstruction. However, some scholars have clearly pointed out that all claims, including property claims, are relative rights. The difference between these two views lies not in the definition of absolute or relative rights, but in the meaning of the right to claim property rights, that is, under what circumstances there exists a right to claim property rights. If there is a right to claim property rights before the obstruction or danger of property rights has occurred, then this right to claim property rights does indeed have absolute (worldly) nature. If there is a property right claim only when the obstruction or danger of property rights actually occurs, then this property right claim can only have relativity, and the counterpart of the property right claim can only be a certain qualified obstruction person. The author believes that only when the obstruction or danger of property rights occurs (and is ongoing) does a property right claim exist, otherwise the property right claim cannot be exercised at all, nor can it be sued against a "clear defendant" (Article 122 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China). In this sense, the legal norms of "having the right to request/demand" in Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulate relative rights.
On the other hand, the relative right to personal information is not (at least not entirely) a remedial claim arising from the infringement of personal information rights. For example, the right to access, copy, and carry is not based on the infringement of personal information rights, but rather on the initial relative rights. In addition, as a remedial right of request, the function of the right to request property rights is to fulfill the obligations imposed by property rights on others. In contrast, the function of the relative right to personal information is different. As mentioned above, the absolute right of personal information imposes an obligation on processors not to process personal information without consent. When a processor violates this obligation, the purpose of the request to stop infringement, eliminate obstacles, and eliminate danger based on the absolute right of personal information is to force processors not to continue processing personal information (as detailed below). However, the functions of the relative right to personal information are not limited to this. The right to access and copy, the right to carry, and the right to correct and supplement personal information can provide individuals with more legal protection beyond the "unauthorized processing of personal information".
From this, it can be seen that after the processing of personal information, the several rights enjoyed by individuals against processors as stipulated in Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law cannot be integrated into the legal status of personal information before it is processed. Although subjective rights related to personal information are referred to as personal information rights (Articles 1 and 2 of the Personal Information Protection Law), from the perspective of the formal validity of rights, individuals enjoy at least two non negotiable personal information rights. Before the processing of personal information, the rights and interests of personal information have a universal nature, imposing a directive obligation on any processor in the world not to process it without consent; After processing, personal information rights and interests have a human nature, and individuals can exercise several rights of request from the processor who implements the processing behavior based on this. This is the "binary construction theory of personal information rights" referred to in this article, which is the absolute right of personal information and the relative right of personal information. They jointly serve the concept of information self-determination, but there are fundamental differences that cannot be reduced. Of course, the author does not advocate that the absolute right to personal information and the relative right to personal information are mutually exclusive. The formation of the relative right to personal information does not necessarily mean the loss of the absolute right to personal information. That is to say, after a specific processor processes personal information, individuals have relative rights to that specific processor's personal information. At the same time, for those potential and unspecified processors, the individual still enjoys absolute personal information rights regarding their personal information. Personal information rights are not "entities" in the material world. While an individual enjoys absolute rights to personal information, they may also have multiple relative rights to personal information against multiple processors. The purpose of this article's argument is to point out the existence of initial relative rights of personal information, which cannot be absorbed into the absolute right of personal information, nor can they be equated with the remedial claim of the absolute right of personal information. As an initial relative right, the relief mechanisms for rights such as the right to access and copy, the right to carry, and the right to correct and supplement also have their unique characteristics.
3.2 The foundation of personal information relative rights
Although the rights of individuals in handling activities belong to initial relative rights, these relative rights mainly come from legal provisions, unlike contractual rights, which are mainly created by the parties freely. Although the degree of autonomy of the individual or processor in the legal relationship between the two parties is limited, it cannot be completely denied that the individual or processor has autonomy in the relative rights of personal information.
3.2.1 Prior provisions of the law
The reason why the law requires prior provisions on the relative right of personal information, rather than leaving it to individuals and processors to decide on their own, is mainly due to two reasons: firstly, unequal strength. Individuals usually do not have the strength to negotiate with processors, so the law adopts a "biased protection" model, empowering the weaker party and imposing obligations, responsibilities, and supervision on the stronger party. The second is information asymmetry. Individuals face a large number of processors who are unable to understand their specific information, and the economic benefits of personal information relative rights are often insignificant for individuals. Even if some individuals have sufficient strength, they do not spend time and energy negotiating with processors. At this point, the law often adopts a protection strategy of "the mandatory regulation", which pre stipulates several rights enjoyed by the party who is in a position of information vulnerability. Based on the above two reasons, the Personal Information Protection Law has formulated a standardized and statutory relative right in advance. Once an individual establishes a legal relationship with a processor regarding personal information processing, that individual naturally enjoys the statutory relative right to personal information.
Some scholars believe that the legal relationship between an individual and a processor belongs to an "information trust relationship", whereby the processor assumes fiduciary obligations towards the individual. The reason for drawing on the trust theory of the Anglo American legal system is to shape the content of the rights and obligations between individuals and processors, that is, to regulate the trust relationship between individuals and processors through the legal framework of constructive trusts. This approach seems to have two interpretations. A stronger version is to use constructive trust as a normative theory, which develops and enriches the legal relationship between individuals and processors when there is no explicit provision in statutory law. However, in cases where the Personal Information Protection Law, the Civil Code, and other laws and regulations provide specific provisions for the legal relationship between individuals and processors, it is no longer necessary to rely on constructive trusts to determine the legal relationship between individuals and processors. A weaker version uses constructive trusts as descriptive tools to describe the essence of the legal relationship between individuals and processors. If that is the case, then the benefits of using a relatively unfamiliar doctrinal framework in the continental legal system may not seem significant, as the specific content of the legal relationship between individuals and processors ultimately depends on the statutory provisions.
3.2.2 Limited Private Law Autonomy
Although the type, content, and exercise of personal information relative rights are usually predetermined by law, individuals still enjoy a certain degree of private law autonomy. This is because the directive obligation imposed by the absolute right to personal information on unspecified processors is that personal information cannot be processed in principle without consent. In terms of directional obligations, individuals have the authority to decide whether to exempt others from their obligations or not, that is, the authority to agree or refuse to handle them. There is some controversy in the theoretical community regarding the nature of individual consent. One view holds that consent has the dual attributes of illegal obstruction and legal action in tort law. One view is that consent is a disposition of personal information rights or an atypical expression of intention. There is also a viewpoint that personal consent is not a legal act, but rather a cause of illegal obstruction. The essence of the above argument lies in whether personal consent is a legal act.
This article argues that from a functionalist perspective, personal consent should be recognized as a legal act. This is because the function of legal acts is to enable each individual to freely shape their legal relationships with others within prescribed boundaries. Since individuals have the authority to decide whether to exempt or not to exempt others from their obligations, when individuals exempt processors from their obligations, they change the legal relationship inherent in the absolute right to personal information. In this sense, individuals shape their legal relationship with the processor according to their own will, thus agreeing to achieve the concept of private law autonomy pursued by the legal behavior system.
Of course, personal consent is only the concept of achieving private law autonomy within a limited scope. A contract is a model of legal behavior, where the parties can independently decide whether and with whom to enter into a contract in what form and content. In contrast, when individuals agree to privacy policies, they cannot determine their form and content, and can only decide whether to agree or disagree. After personal consent, the legal relationship between the individual and the processor depends on the prior provisions of the law, unlike the rights and obligations in a contract that mainly depend on the independent decisions of the parties. However, this does not mean that personal consent does not have a valid meaning and therefore constitutes a factual act. The purpose of a legal act is to elicit the legal effect of the parties' intention. The "legal effect" can contain complex content of multiple rights and obligations like a sales contract, or it can only be simple content such as abandoning a right or exempting an obligation. For example, the exercise of formative rights such as the right to terminate is a legal act. When a party exercises the right of termination, the legal effect of their intention may only be to terminate the contractual relationship between the two parties. As for the rights and obligations after termination, the party may not have fully considered it, or after considering it, decide not to negotiate with the other party and handle it according to the legal effect stipulated by the law. This example is intended to indicate that as long as the expression of the parties has the legal effect of their intention, no matter how simple the legal effect may be, the expression should also be recognized as a legal act. Similarly, when an individual gives consent, although it is not possible to determine which rights the individual enjoys, they may enjoy several rights according to legal provisions. However, when an individual gives consent, they are relieved of the obligations of the processor according to their intention. Therefore, personal consent should also be recognized as a legal act.
The benefit of recognizing personal consent as a legal act lies in the fact that in the absence of special provisions in personal information protection rules, personal consent can be applied or analogically applied to the provisions of legal acts. On the one hand, the content of privacy policies can go beyond the relative rights of personal information stipulated in Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law. For example, processors can grant personal income distribution rights or other rights in privacy policies based on competitive considerations. If the legal nature of privacy policy is denied and personal consent is characterized as factual behavior, then the content expressed by the processor or individual in the privacy policy will not become a legal relationship between the processor and the individual. If the processor wants to grant individuals other rights to seek a competitive advantage, they will have to enter into separate contracts, which will incur additional costs. On the contrary, if the legal nature of the privacy policy is affirmed, then the processor can directly grant individuals other rights in the privacy policy, which will be obtained with the individual's consent. On the other hand, recognizing personal consent as a legal act can also incorporate privacy policies into the regulation of standard clauses in Articles 496 and 497 of the Civil Code. When the processor restricts or excludes the relative rights of legal personal information in the privacy policy, the relevant format clauses can be deemed invalid according to Article 497 (2) and (3) of the Civil Code.
3.2.3 Types of relative rights to personal information
Although Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law continuously stipulates the right to know, the right to make decisions, the right to restrict or refuse processing, the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, the right to delete, and the right to explain, there are differences in the hierarchy of these rights. For example, Article 44 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that the abstract level of the right to know and the right to make decisions is higher than other rights. Therefore, some scholars refer to the right to make decisions as a "penetrating concept", the right to know as a "core right", and other rights as a series of scattered and intersecting powers. This article will make another distinction between the series of weights of scattering crossover from the perspective of formal effectiveness. In fact, the formulation of the Personal Information Protection Law has already demonstrated the existence of this distinction.
The first sentence of Article 47 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that "in any of the following circumstances, the personal information processor shall proactively delete personal information", which imposes an obligation on the processor to proactively delete personal information. In contrast, the provisions of Articles 45, 46, and 48 of the law do not impose similar proactive obligations. From the perspective of formal effectiveness, there are differences between the right to delete and the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to explain. Existing theories seem to have not yet revealed the significance of this difference. For example, there is a viewpoint that the obligation of active deletion stipulated in Article 47 of the Personal Information Protection Law is not a civil obligation, and the violation of this obligation by the processor may result in administrative liability, which does not necessarily result in civil liability. There is room for discussion on this viewpoint. This is because the situations listed in Article 47, Paragraph 1, Items 1 to 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law that should be deleted belong to situations where the processor no longer enjoys or never enjoys the legal basis for processing personal information. In this situation, if the processor continues to store or otherwise process personal information, it will constitute an infringement or obstruction of the absolute right to personal information. The right to delete personal information is actually another form of expression based on the absolute right of personal information to stop infringement and eliminate obstruction requests. In the right to request cessation of infringement and removal of obstruction, if the infringer or obstruction allows the infringement or obstruction to continue, they shall ultimately be liable for compensation for the resulting damage. Similarly, if the legal situation for the right to delete personal information is met, and the processor does not actively delete personal information, the damage caused during this period should also be borne by the processor for compensation. In this sense, denying the initiative to delete an obligation as a civil obligation will derogate from the individual's right to relief.
This article argues that the essence of the differences expressed in the statutory provisions of Article 47, Article 45, Article 46, and Article 48 of the Personal Information Protection Law lies in the different time points at which the relative right to personal information is established or actually exists. In other words, the right to delete already exists before an individual makes a request based on the conformity of the constituent elements, and the processor is actually bound by the obligation to delete. The existence of the right to inspect and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to explain and explain is conditional on the individual's request. Only after the individual makes the request, the processor is actually bound by the obligation to cooperate in inspecting and copying. For the convenience of writing, this article refers to the former as "actual claim rights" and several rights of the latter as "potential claim rights".
Firstly, the right to delete belongs to the actual right to request. The first sentence of Article 47 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that "in any of the following circumstances, the personal information processor shall actively delete personal information", which carries two different normative functions: firstly, this sentence indicates that the right to delete is different from the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to explain. The right to delete is not a potential right to request, but a right to request that will actually exist once the legal situation is met, The processor is bound by the obligation to delete without the need for an individual request. Although Article 46 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that the right to correct or supplement personal information is based on the requirement of "inaccurate or incomplete personal information", this article does not require processors to actively correct or supplement personal information, as Article 47 does. Therefore, the actual point of existence of the right to correct or supplement personal information is not when it is "inaccurate or incomplete personal information", but when an individual requests it. Some views consider the reasons for the occurrence of rights rather than the formal validity of rights, and include the right to correct, supplement, and delete as negative powers, that is, only when the integrity, accuracy, or privacy of personal information is compromised. Although this viewpoint is reasonable, it does not reveal a significant difference in the expression of the right to correct, supplement, and delete in the statutory law. Secondly, the obligation of active deletion stipulated in this sentence should be a civil obligation. If the processor fails to delete the personal information that should be deleted in a timely manner, individuals can not only request the processor to delete it, but also demand that the processor bear the liability for damages suffered during the delayed deletion period. However, individuals need to bear the burden of proof for the existence of damage and the causal relationship between delayed deletion and damage.
Secondly, the right to access and copy, the right to carry, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to explain belong to potential claims. In other words, legislators only grant individuals the possibility of making these requests to the processor. The statement 'individual exercise of the right to access and copy' contains two meanings: firstly, the individual exercises a right of formation, turns potential requests into actual requests, and imposes a legal obligation on the processor to provide personal information to the individual. The processor is not obligated to provide personal information to the individual until the individual makes a clear request to access the copy. The second is that the individual has exercised a right of request, which requires the processor to fulfill the directional obligation related to the right to access and copy. The following will point out that the right to access and copy is a potential right of request rather than an actual right of request, which determines that individuals cannot directly sue the people's court to exercise the right to access and copy.
4 The System Construction of the Relief Mechanism for Personal Information Rights and Interests
4.1 The Relief Mechanism for the Absolute Right of Personal Information
The legal status enjoyed by individuals regarding their personal information before it is processed for a specific purpose, although not named“ ×× Power ", but in essence, it has the nature of absolute power. At this point, personal information rights are protected by both the right to claim compensation for damages and the right to stop infringement, eliminate obstacles, and eliminate danger.
On the one hand, Article 69 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that if the processing of personal information infringes on the rights and interests of personal information and causes damage, and the personal information processor cannot prove that they are not at fault, they shall bear the liability for compensation for infringement damages. As for the constituent elements of the right to claim compensation for infringement of personal information rights, what is closely related to the main idea of this article is the specific determination of "infringement of personal information rights". As mentioned earlier, the key to infringement of rights and interests lies in whether the actions of others violate a directional obligation imposed by a legal status on others. Firstly, the directive obligation imposed by the absolute right to personal information on unspecified processors is that personal information cannot be processed without consent. Based on this, processing behaviors such as "unauthorized processing of personal information" or "illegal use of personal information for automated decision-making" constitute infringement of personal information rights due to their lack of personal consent. Of course, the principle of purpose limitation requires that the processing activity must be restricted by the processing purpose, and once the processing purpose is exceeded, personal consent must be obtained again. Therefore, regardless of whether the processor obtains consent when collecting personal information, as long as the processor's processing purpose is new and has not yet been communicated to the individual, the processing activity carried out by the processor will constitute an infringement of the absolute right to personal information. Secondly, in the process of personal information processing, the processor also bears the obligation of ensuring personal information security. The reason why Article 51 of the Personal Information Protection Law imposes personal information security obligations on processors is not solely based on the absolute right of personal information, but also on the closer relationship between individuals and specific processors. In other words, the obligation of absolute power imposed on an unspecified third party is usually a negative obligation of inaction, but when the parties enter a closer relationship, the law often requires one party to assume a security obligation or stricter duty of care for the civil rights and interests of the other party. Similarly, in personal information processing activities, processors and individuals are in a long-term and close relative relationship. Therefore, Article 51 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires processors to assume security obligations for personal information while processing it. Finally, although the Personal Information Protection Law imposes several obligations on processors, not all breaches of these obligations will constitute an infringement of the absolute right to personal information. For example, Article 52 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires certain processors to designate a person in charge of personal information protection. Violation of this obligation by processors does not constitute infringement of personal information rights. In other words, only when the obligations imposed by law on the processor constitute a directional obligation regarding the absolute right of personal information, the violation of the processor's obligations constitutes an infringement of personal information rights.
On the other hand, the Personal Information Protection Law does not explicitly stipulate whether the rights and interests of personal information are protected by the right to stop infringement, eliminate obstacles, and eliminate dangers. This article argues that before processing personal information, individuals have a legal status similar to absolute rights over their personal information, and processors are not allowed to process personal information without consent (unless it meets other legal foundations). When the processor processes personal information without consent and without any other legal basis, individuals have the right to request cessation of infringement, removal of obstacles, and elimination of danger as stipulated in Articles 995 and 179 of the Civil Code. However, it should be noted that since Chapter 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that the rights enjoyed by individuals in processing activities are relative rights, there is no possibility of the application of absolute rights such as cessation of infringement, exclusion of obstacles, and elimination of danger when the processor refuses to fulfill these relative rights. At this point, individuals should apply the relevant provisions on breach of contract liability by analogy as a remedy.
The recognition of individuals' right to request cessation of infringement, removal of obstacles, and elimination of danger based on personal information is actually beneficial in compensating for the insufficient relief function of the right to deletion. Although Article 47 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates the right of individuals to delete information from processors, this provision is not sufficient to protect the satisfactory status of personal information rights. For example, this clause only stipulates the right of individuals to request deletion from the processor, and does not specify the right of individuals to delete from the trustee. However, in practice, when the processor hands over personal information to the trustee for processing, the trustee often also stores personal information. Although Article 59 of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulates that the trustee assists the processor in fulfilling its obligations under this law, this assistance obligation only involves the internal relationship between the processor and the trustee, and it cannot be inferred that individuals also have the right to request deletion from the trustee. The right to stop infringement and eliminate obstruction can remedy this deficiency. This is because stopping the continuous infringement behavior that is dominated by the will of the person and eliminating the obstruction state that is unrelated to the person's will. Based on this, regardless of whether the trustee is aware that the personal information they are entrusted to process has not been approved, individuals can claim the right to stop infringement or exclude obstruction from the trustee, thereby achieving the relief effect of deleting personal information.
4.2 The Relief Mechanism for the Relative Right of Personal Information
Due to Article 69 of the Personal Information Protection Law, which stipulates the liability for infringement of personal information rights caused by personal information infringement, the monist of personal information rights often equates personal information rights with absolute rights (or legally protected interests), and examines the relief mechanism of personal information rights from the perspective of infringement liability. Some views further argue that when an individual requests access to a copy from the processor, but the processor refuses to perform without justifiable reasons, it will constitute an infringement, and the individual can claim to exclude the right to request personal rights such as obstruction. This goes against the expression habits of traditional civil law to a certain extent. The primary protected objects of tort law are absolute rights such as property rights, personality rights, and intellectual property rights. Although relative rights such as creditor's rights are also protected to some extent by tort law, the dispute over the protection of creditor's rights in tort law is aimed at the infringement of creditor's rights by third parties. As for the debtor's "infringement" of creditor's rights, the relevant provisions on liability for breach of contract are usually applicable and are not discussed as infringement issues. When the relative right of personal information is "infringed", the relief mechanism that individuals can seek cannot be simply equated with the absolute right to request and the right to claim compensation for infringement damages. Otherwise, it not only does not conform to the expression habits of traditional civil law, but also easily ignores some important features of the relative right relief mechanism in theory. In this sense, Article 69 of the Personal Information Protection Law only stipulates the "tort liability" for "infringement of personal information rights", which is too narrow.
According to traditional civil law theory, the legal protection of relative rights usually only involves the right to request. As for the right to form and the right to defend, although they also belong to relative rights, it is "completely impossible" for them to be violated. In the right of request, the creditor's right is a typical right of request, therefore, the basic framework of the right of request is established based on the creditor's right model. When the realization of the right to request is hindered, if the right to request does not have a special nature that cannot be ignored, the general provisions of the applicable creditor's rights can be referred to. Similarly, this article only discusses the relative right of personal information in the sense of the right of request. Therefore, when the processor refuses to fulfill the directional obligations contained in the relative right of personal information, the relief mechanism that individuals can seek is closer to breach of contract liability in the system, rather than tort liability. Especially in areas where there is ambiguity in the content, exercise, and remedies of the relative right to personal information, relevant rules of contract law rather than tort law should be applied by analogy. Of course, some critics may argue that this is formalism and dogmatism. As a special law, the Personal Information Protection Law may not follow the expression habits of traditional civil law and refer to the civil liability arising from the processor's "infringement" of personal information relative rights as "tort liability". Even so, when determining the "tort liability" of personal information relative rights, it should also be noted that the directional obligation of relative rights is usually a positive obligation, unlike the directional obligation of absolute rights, which is usually a negative obligation of inaction. This will bring significant differences to the constitutive requirements and legal effects of the relief mechanism for personal information relative rights.
4.2.1 Elements of composition
Firstly, individuals exercise the relative right to personal information. As mentioned above, the rights of access, reproduction, portability, correction and supplementation stipulated in Articles 45 and 46 of the Personal Information Protection Law belong to the "potential right of request". Only when an individual actually makes a request will the potential right to request be realized and impose an actual legal obligation on the processor. Clarifying this point can help solve the following disputes in practice: can individuals directly file a lawsuit with the people's court to exercise their relative rights to access and copy personal information? Some courts believe that the reason why individuals need to make a request to the processor first and then file a lawsuit in the people's court after the processor refuses is because setting up a pre procedure for individuals to file a request for relief in the court can save judicial resources. This article argues that conserving judicial resources is only a subsidiary benefit and not a fundamental reason for requiring individuals to first make requests to the processor. The reason why an individual is required to make a request to the processor first is because the right to review and copy, the right to correct and supplement, and the right to explain are all "potential requests". If individuals do not make these requests, the processor has no way of knowing to whom they should fulfill what obligations. Some views further suggest that the right to delete also requires individuals to first make a request to the processor, and only after being rejected can they file a lawsuit with the court. There is room for discussion on this viewpoint. According to Article 47 of the Personal Information Protection Law, when the legal requirements are met, the processor should proactively delete personal information, indicating that individuals do not need to first request deletion from the processor, and the processor has an actual obligation to delete. Therefore, individuals can either claim the right to delete from the processor or directly sue the people's court to exercise the right to delete.
Secondly, the processor refuses to fulfill or fails to fully fulfill or delays in fulfilling relevant obligations. According to Article 50 (2) of the Personal Information Protection Law, if the processor refuses an individual's request to exercise their rights, the individual may file a lawsuit with the people's court in accordance with the law. In theory, it is generally believed that the infringement of personal information relative rights refers to the processor's unjustified refusal to fulfill relevant obligations. In terms of absolute rights, as the obligor bears the obligation of passive inaction, there is usually only a question of "yes" or "no" whether others have violated the directional obligation of absolute rights. However, in relative rights, due to the fact that the obligor often assumes the obligation of active payment, there is a problem of "incomplete performance" or "delayed performance" by the obligor. In other words, the infringement of personal information relative rights is not limited to the processor's refusal to fulfill relevant obligations, but also includes the processor's incomplete or delayed performance of relevant obligations. Specifically, on the one hand, Article 45 (2) and Article 46 (2) of the Personal Information Protection Law stipulate that processors should provide "timely" inquiries, copies, corrections, and supplements. If processors delay in fulfilling their obligations, it will constitute an infringement of the relative rights of personal information. On the other hand, the Personal Information Protection Law does not provide detailed provisions on how processors exercise their relative rights to personal information, but only stipulates in Article 50 that "personal information processors should establish a convenient mechanism for accepting and processing applications for exercising their rights". Due to the fact that the rights enjoyed by individuals in personal information processing activities belong to relative rights and are closer in nature to creditor's rights, the adjustment is made to the legal relationship between specific subjects, rather than to the legal relationship between the right holder and non-specific obligors, like absolute rights such as ownership. Therefore, when the processor fulfills the directional obligations related to personal information relative rights, The "obligation to fully perform" stipulated in Article 509 (1) of the Civil Code and the "principle of good faith" stipulated in Article 2 should be applied by analogy. When the processor fails to fully fulfill the relevant obligations, individuals can also demand that the processor continue to perform, take remedial measures, and compensate for losses. For example, if an individual requests access to and replication of personal information from a processor, but the processor only provides a portion of the personal information, this incomplete performance also constitutes a violation of the relative right to personal information.
4.2.2 Legal effects
When the processor refuses to fulfill or fails to fully fulfill or delays in fulfilling obligations related to personal information relative rights, according to Article 50 (2) of the Personal Information Protection Law, individuals can "file a lawsuit with the people's court". However, this provision only stipulates the right of individuals to file lawsuits in the people's court in procedural law, without specifying the types of claims and their basic norms in substantive law. This article argues that, based on the path of applying relevant rules of contract law by analogy, when the processor refuses to perform or fails to fully perform or delays in fulfilling the directional obligation of personal information relative rights, the types of claims that individuals can claim include the right to continue performance, take remedial measures, or compensate for losses as stipulated in Article 577 of the Civil Code.
Firstly, when the processor refuses to fulfill or fails to fully fulfill or delays in fulfilling the relevant obligations, individuals can request the processor to continue fulfilling the relevant obligations. Undoubtedly, when an individual's rights in handling activities cannot be realized, the individual can enforce their rights through the court. In other words, having rights means having broad control over the obligations of others. When others violate or are about to violate their obligations, individuals may decide not to enforce or enforce the relevant obligations. However, the question is, what kind of legal system should an individual's relative right to personal information be reflected in the statutory law through the mechanism of enforcing relevant obligations through the court? Some scholars believe that the requirement of "filing a lawsuit with a people's court" in Article 50 (2) of the Personal Information Protection Law should simultaneously meet the requirements of "infringing on personal information rights" and "causing damage". This viewpoint essentially limits the individual's remedies to compensation for losses and negates the individual's authority to enforce the relative right to personal information, which may be inappropriate. Some views suggest that when an individual's right to access and copy is unreasonably denied, the individual can claim to exclude the right to request obstruction. The author believes that this viewpoint may not be in line with China's civil law tradition. According to traditional civil law doctrine, the right to exclude obstruction is defined as the absolute right to request, which can only be applied in cases where the absolute right is obstructed. The right to access and copy belongs to the right to request, and there is no possibility of applying the absolute right to request. This article believes that, given that the rights enjoyed by individuals in processing activities such as the right to access and copy are all relative rights, when the realization of relative rights is hindered, the right to continue performance as stipulated in Article 577 and Article 580 (1) of the Civil Code should be applied by analogy, rather than the right to exclude obstacles (stop infringement, eliminate obstacles) and eliminate danger as stipulated in Articles 236 and 995 of the Civil Code.
Secondly, when the processor refuses to perform or fails to fully perform or delays in performing the relevant obligations, the application of Article 580 (1) of the Civil Code to continue performance also means that in cases where the debtor is legally or de facto unable to perform the debt, or the subject matter of the debt is not suitable for compulsory execution or the cost of performance is too high, the debtor does not need to perform the original payment obligation, but the debtor should take remedial measures. The same applies to the relative rights of personal information. In fact, the provisions of Article 47 (2) of the Personal Information Protection Law precisely reflect the legal concept of inability to fulfill debts. According to this provision, when the retention period stipulated by laws and regulations has not expired, the processor shall not "legally" delete personal information, otherwise it will violate public law provisions; When it is technically difficult to delete personal information, the processor cannot "de facto" delete personal information. In this case, the individual may not request the deletion of personal information, but may request the processor to stop processing. From the perspective of contract law, cessation of processing is precisely the term "taking remedial measures" in Article 577 of the Civil Code.
Thirdly, if there are other personal losses after the processor fulfills its obligations or takes remedial measures, according to Article 583 of the Civil Code, the processor shall also compensate for the losses. Among them, losses include property damage and mental damage. Although the processor refuses to fulfill or fails to fully fulfill or delays in fulfilling relevant obligations, which infringes on the relative right of personal information, individuals can still claim compensation for mental damage. This is because, according to Article 996 of the Civil Code, if the breach of contract damages the personality rights of the other party and causes serious mental damage, the injured party can claim compensation for mental damage when choosing to sue for breach of contract. This clause affirms that when the obligor of relative rights violates their obligations and damages their personal rights and interests, they also need to bear the compensation responsibility for mental damage. Therefore, when the processor refuses to fulfill or fails to fully fulfill or delays in fulfilling the relevant obligations of personal information relative rights, causing serious mental damage to the individual, the individual can also claim compensation for mental damage. For example, in an extraterritorial case, the plaintiff requested access to and copying of relevant case materials from their original lawyer (as the defendant's processor), but as the defendant's processor, it delayed providing information for nine months, resulting in the plaintiff being unable to resolve the relevant dispute in a timely manner, causing unease and pain in the fertilization process. As a defendant, the processor shall bear the liability for mental damage compensation due to the delay in fulfilling the plaintiff's obligation to cooperate in the inspection and reproduction.
epilogue
The research in this article indicates that even in the field of civil law, personal information rights and interests are not singular, but binary. Before personal information is processed, the law needs to adjust the legal relationship between individuals and unspecified processors. At this time, individuals have the right to the world over their personal information, and their legal status is more similar to absolute rights such as ownership, intellectual property, and personality rights. After personal information is processed, what needs to be adjusted by law is the legal relationship between individuals and specific processors, therefore, personal information rights belong to relative rights. The answer to the questions of whether the right to personal information exists in China's legal system and what its legal effect is ultimately depends on which legal relationships are stipulated in China's legal system regarding personal information. Due to the Personal Information Protection Law regulating the relationship between individuals and unspecified processors, as well as the relationship between individuals and specific processors, personal information rights and interests are binary. In a broader perspective, the Personal Information Protection Law also stipulates the legal relationship between individuals and the state regarding the protection of personal information. At this time, the personal information rights enjoyed by individuals point to the state, which on the one hand refers to the subjective defense right of the state, and on the other hand requires the state to assume the protection obligation of excluding third-party infringement. It can be said that in the overall legal system of our country, the rights and interests of personal information are diverse. Therefore, any attempt to reduce personal information rights to a single structure will inevitably result in the loss of certain important features of personal information rights.